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De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and The Choice for Europe

Soft Sources, Weak Evidence

Robert H. Lieshout, Mathieu L. L. Segers, and Anna M. van der Vleuten

We must pay more attention to the quality of evidence.

Andrew Moravcsik

Introduction

Admiration for Andrew Moravcsik’s achievement in *The Choice for Europe* constitutes the basis of this article. 1 Moravcsik had us pretty much convinced that his revisionist “commercial” interpretation of the European integration process was correct. As one of us observed in a brief bibliographic overview of English-language literature on the subject, “this interpretation is most convincing where Moravcsik discusses the politics of de Gaulle.” 2 Moravcsik’s claim is twofold: first, that in contrast to what everybody else seems to believe, Charles de Gaulle’s European policy was not guided mainly by geopolitical aims but by commercial objectives; second, that de Gaulle and his aides managed to conceal these true aims from contemporaries and historians alike through “deliberate deception.” Moravcsik explains that he was able to draw these “overtly revisionist conclusions” because he, as opposed to most students of European Community (EC) policymaking, relied predominantly on hard primary sources.

Naturally, *The Choice for Europe* (TCfE) became a frequently consulted

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source for our own research into the history of European integration. In this context, however, it soon became clear that not all of Moravcsik’s quotations and references were correct.\(^3\) As the number of misquotations and incorrect references continued to rise, we felt it was time to take a closer look at Moravcsik’s sources. We were encouraged to do so in part by Moravcsik’s own approval of “the insistence of fine diplomatic historians on precision in such matters,”\(^4\) even though we ourselves are just ordinary political scientists and not fine diplomatic historians.

It will be clear that for reasons of time and space we had to limit our scrutiny of his work. We decided that the best approach was to concentrate on the section of *The Choice for Europe* dealing with de Gaulle’s European policy (TCfE, pp. 176–197), a section that is crucial for the argument developed elsewhere in the book. This section also undoubtedly is the one that Moravcsik regards with the greatest pride (cf. TCfE, pp. 83–84). Although we are aware that he elaborated and refined his argument in a far more extensive article on de Gaulle’s European policies in the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, we refrained from checking the references of this two-part article because they were taken mostly from the same set of sources.\(^5\)

The outline of our critique of Moravcsik’s work is as follows. In the first main section, we discuss Moravcsik’s methodological claim that his interpretation of the European integration process must be considered more reliable because of the superiority of his method. Our conclusion is that, on the contrary, Moravcsik’s method leaves a lot to be desired. In the second section, we deal with Moravcsik’s commercial interpretation of de Gaulle’s European policy. Our conclusion is that Moravcsik fails to establish his revisionist claims and that his argument seems to result from a serious misreading of the two sources on which it entirely depends. In the third section, we turn to the one major weakness Moravcsik is prepared to admit—the lack of direct evidence that agricultural peak organizations influenced de Gaulle’s actions. We briefly discuss the epistemological problems posed by his attempt to revise his own revisionism. In the final section, we sum up what is left of Moravcsik’s revisionist explanation of de Gaulle’s European policy in view of our negative findings. We have also included two appendices. In Appendix I we list the

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sources used by Moravcsik and give our assessment of their quality. In Appendix II we present a detailed, note-by-note discussion of Moravcsik’s handling of his sources.

**Moravcsik’s Methodological Claim**

In explaining “why this book should be considered more reliable,” Moravcsik time and again insists on the importance of solid archival research. He imposes high standards on the quality of his sources in order to distinguish his research from previous research in the field of European integration. We wholeheartedly endorse the principle of scrupulous archival research and the use of “hard” sources whenever possible, and we reject the practice of “forging sweeping conclusions from weak data.” These matters are especially important because, as Moravcsik rightly observes, when we seek to explain processes that are not directly observable (e.g., how leaders and other key actors form their preferences), there is bound to be an element of interpretation in our study. Therefore, secondary literature—based either on inferences, no matter how well founded, or on other secondary sources—can never provide us with sufficient evidence for this interpretation. Such literature attributes causes and motivations instead of disclosing them. Precisely for that reason, when we have to decide which of a number of competing interpretations is best supported by the evidence, the quality and representativeness of sources are of the utmost importance (cf. TCIE, p. 80).

This implies that when deciding whether to accept Moravcsik’s revisionist interpretation of the European integration process, we first have to look at the sources he has used. How else could we be convinced of the correctness of his “commercial” interpretation of Gaullist foreign policy and his dismissal of the explanations put forward in the other “thousands of works on de Gaulle” he has consulted (TCIE, p. 83 n. 125)? Moravcsik himself argues that his interpretation is more reliable than the others because “wherever possible, potentially controversial attributions of motive or strategy are backed by 'hard' primary sources” (TCIE, p. 10). He applauds “the more rigorous methods typically employed by historians,” as opposed to “most work on integration by political scientists and policy analysts” (TCIE, p. 83). He notes that when he had to rely on secondary sources, “any citation to a secondary source to bolster an assessment of motive, strategy, or knowledge indicates a page on

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which a primary source appears” (TCfE, p. 83). Let us now have a closer look at the quality of sources and the way they are handled by Moravcsik.

**Quality of Sources**

Moravcsik argues that “the reliability of a source is a function of the extent to which the activity it documents is one in which it is costly to manipulate or misstate the truth.” From this follows his “general rule” that “the greater the difficulty of manipulating or concealing evidence of what really occurred at the time, the more reliable (the ‘harder’) the source in retrospect” (TCfE, p. 82). On the basis of this criterion, Moravcsik distinguishes three types of sources.

He gives pride of place to “hard” primary sources (HP), which, he argues, are the most reliable sources because they give “direct evidence of decision-making” (TCfE, p. 10). They include “internal government reports, contemporary records of confidential deliberations among key decision-makers, verbatim diary entries, corroborated memoirs by participants who appear to lack an ulterior motive for misrepresentation, and lengthy interviews with numerous policy-makers in which the interviewer challenged or sought to corroborate the *ex post* claims of policy-makers” (TCfE, p. 82). Next in order of preference are “soft” primary sources (SP), including “contemporary newspaper and magazine reports, . . . public statements by government spokesmen and national leaders justifying their actions, and *ex post* justifications in memoirs or interviews by participants who either were not in a position to know the truth or had an evident incentive to inflate (or deny) their own influence” (TCfE, p. 81). Moravcsik questions the reliability of this type of source because “speculation or distortion is often politically or professionally profitable” for the “politician, journalist or commentator” who produces public reports or makes public statements. At the most, these sources may be “useful to identify plausible causal conjectures or hypotheses, but in themselves [they] constitute an unreliable basis on which to test such hypotheses” (TCfE, p. 81).

The third type of source specified by Moravcsik is the hard secondary source (HS), which includes “sections of secondary sources that themselves report facts based on direct citation of a hard primary source” (TCfE, p. 83). Moravcsik admits that this type of source is less reliable, but, he says, he used HS as a “methodological compromise” when no hard primary sources were available. He assures us that he relied on only the portions of secondary sources that cited facts drawn from hard primary sources and that he sought to avoid citing “the conclusions and interpretations of a secondary author”
Moravcsik fails to identify a fourth possible category of sources: soft secondary sources (SS). We decided that scholarly publications by non-participants, based primarily on HS and SP, fall within this category.

When we turn to the section of TCfE on “De Gaulle’s Deliberate Deception,” we expect to find extensive use of HP and far less use of the three other types of sources. We expect this because Moravcsik emphasizes that “the imputation of geopolitical motives to de Gaulle . . . rests almost entirely on a stylized reading of soft sources—French government statements, contemporary journalism, de Gaulle’s memoirs and writings, and secondary speculation . . . [whereas] hard sources, including records of cabinet meetings, transcripts of diplomatic interactions, and government documents, unambiguously support the primacy of commercial concerns” (TCfE, pp. 177–178). However, when we actually categorize the sources used in this section, we find the following. Of the 62 different sources used, 21 are primary sources and 41 are secondary sources. The latter category includes 34 SS and only 7 HS. Of the primary sources, 15 are SP and a mere 6 are HP. Thus, fewer than one-tenth of the sources used by Moravcsik in this section are hard primary sources (see Appendix I for further details).

Is this vital section based, as promised, on records of cabinet meetings and government documents? A closer look at the HP used by Moravcsik suggests not. Moravcsik has only sparingly made use of the published declassified records of the West German and British governments, as well as the collected letters and notes from de Gaulle. By contrast, he has relied extensively on the two volumes of memoirs published by Alain Peyrefitte, a Gaullist deputy who became de Gaulle’s press spokesman and state secretary of information in 1962. This is troubling because there is certainly reason to doubt the “hardness” of Peyrefitte’s recollections. We agree with Alan Milward, who wonders: “Would we so confidently analyze the foreign policy priorities of any American presidency on the basis of two books by the president’s chief public relations official and spokesperson?” Irwin Wall also believes that Peyrefitte is not entirely reliable. Hence, it is highly questionable whether Peyrefitte’s recollections of his conversations with de Gaulle should be regarded as an HP. We nevertheless decided to use this same classification, following the time-honored practice in scholarly debates of making our opponent’s position as strong as possible. Because Peyrefitte’s recollections are crucial for Moravcsik’s

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argument, not labeling them as HP would have undermined his position from the start.

Moravcsik insists that he has used primary sources “whenever possible” (TCfE, p. 19) and especially “where some might consider [the book’s] judgments controversial—as in the claim . . . that de Gaulle was motivated by farm interests more than by French grandeur” (TCfE, p. 79; emphasis in original). We wonder whether there were no other primary sources available for the period under study (1958–1966). According to Moravcsik, the limited availability of primary documents was a problem for his analysis of the Maastricht Treaty and the Single European Act, but not for the older cases (TCfE, p. 473). At the same time, he states with respect to de Gaulle that “the bulk of the primary documents from this period . . . remain unavailable” (TCfE, p. 84 n. 126). Still, we would have expected him to make more systematic and extensive use of French government records. He makes no reference at all to the French Diplomatic Documents, which are available in print from 1954 through 1962, or to the holdings of the Quai d’Orsay, which currently makes documents available through 1966 (at the archives of the European University Institute in Florence).9 We must therefore conclude that the sources used in the section on “De Gaulle’s Deliberate Deception” are far “softer” than Moravcsik has claimed and fall well short of the expectations he raises.

Handling of Sources

One of the guidelines for good qualitative research formulated by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba is that “all data and analyses should, insofar as possible, be replicable.”10 Because Moravcsik has provided his analysis with many footnotes containing a large number of references, we decided “to locate the sources used in published work and make [our] own evaluations of the inferences claimed from this information,” as recommended by King, Keohane, and Verba.

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9. The section on de Gaulle does not seem to be an exception as regards the quality of sources used. In a review of TCfE, Jeffrey Anderson observes that “in five case study chapters spanning 386 pages, there are 917 footnotes altogether; about 2% contain references to internal government documents, the hardest of ‘hard’ primary sources. Secondary sources, not to mention political memoirs and other soft primary sources, make up the remaining 98%.” See Jeffrey J. Anderson, review of The Choice for Europe, by Andrew Moravcsik, in American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2 (June 2000), p. 516.

We checked all 226 references in footnotes 37–100 of the section “De Gaulle’s Deliberate Deception.” Of these we were unable to replicate five, including three references to the Harold Macmillan Papers (PREM), an interview by the author with a French official in December 1993 (TCfE, p. 181), and an interview by the author with Snoy et d’Oppuers (TCfE, p. 182). Accordingly, 221 references remained. Of these, 94 are correct, 11 are partly correct, and 116 are not correct (see Appendix II for further details). The results are presented in Table 1 above, broken down according to the “hardness” of the sources from which the references are taken. Of the 71 references to HP, 55 are based on Peyrefitte; of these, 34 are correct, 19 not correct, and 2 partly correct.

We have categorized a reference as not correct when we have been unable to come to the same conclusion that Moravcsik does. In many cases the cited reference did not support his claim because the evidence it provided could be interpreted at least as convincingly in a different way. In many other cases the pages he cited dealt with a totally different subject—for example, a different set of negotiations (e.g., n. 41, Pattison de Ménil; n. 72, Maillard; n. 79, Couve) or a different topic (e.g., n. 44, Willis; n. 44, Lacouture; n. 52, de Gaulle; n. 64 Maillard). In other cases the chronology did not support the explanation he offered (e.g., n. 71, Lamb p. 144, n. 83, Horne). We have categorized references as partly correct when we were unable to decide whether they were fully incorrect or fully correct. In Appendix II we briefly explain why in each case we were unable to make a clear decision.

### Table 1: Correctness of References Cited in The Choice for Europe, pp. 176–197

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Type</th>
<th>HP</th>
<th>SP</th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly correct</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not correct</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: See also Appendix II.*
We distinguished two further categories of problematic references. The first we have termed “inaccurate” references. Moravcsik often mistakenly cites the names of authors (e.g., n. 47, Jebb read Gladwyn), the titles of books (e.g., n. 44, Mémoires instead of Memoirs of Hope), the volumes of a book (e.g., n. 65, Debré 2:432ff instead of 3:431; n. 88, three references to Peyrefitte Vol. 1 instead of 2), page numbers (e.g., n. 56, Peyrefitte II, 265 instead of 263–264; n. 100, de Gaulle p. 132 instead of pp. 131–132), or a combination of these items (e.g., n. 40, de Gaulle, Mémoires, 3:178–180, instead of Memoirs of Hope, p. 187; n. 66, Peyrefitte, Général, 1, instead of Jouve, Général, Vol. 2). In Appendix II, we have listed and corrected all 43 of these inaccuracies. Although such errors make replication a time-consuming affair, we did not let them influence our judgment about the correctness of the references. Therefore this category overlaps with the categories “correct,” “partly correct,” and “not correct.”

The final category we have used pertains to references that, strictly speaking, are correct but have been used by Moravcsik in a questionable manner, have been taken out of context, or are inaccurate with respect to content. We consider this kind of inaccuracy to be more serious than the first. We found twenty of these “note however” references and have added a short comment to each of them, explaining our doubts. For instance, Moravcsik attaches a good deal of importance to the “pattern of objective facts” and the “precise sequence of events” (TcE, pp. 82, 178 n. 37), but when discussing the timing of de Gaulle's decision to veto British entry, Moravcsik states that de Gaulle announced the veto at a meeting of the French Cabinet on 17 December 1962. This statement is wrong because the meeting took place two days later, and, moreover, because de Gaulle revealed his plans only after the Cabinet meeting and did so not in the presence of his ministers but in the presence of Peyrefitte alone (n. 72). As we noted earlier, Moravcsik strongly criticizes the use of secondary literature that is itself based on secondary literature, but this has not kept him from quoting Françoise de la Serre, who quotes Anne Jaumin-Ponsar, who, in her turn, quotes Michel Gaudet (n. 97).

**Net Judgment on Sources**

Only 52 of 221 references, a mere 24 percent, appear to be unproblematic and fully correct. We therefore conclude that both the quality of the sources and Moravcsik's handling of the sources do not meet the expectations raised. He has failed to establish the methodological superiority of the approach on which his revisionist interpretation is based, and therefore we fail to see why The Choice for Europe should be considered more reliable.
Moravcsik’s Revisionist Claims

The Primacy of Commercial Aims

According to Moravcsik, most accounts of the consolidation of the Common Market in the 1960s claim that for statesmen like de Gaulle, Harold Macmillan, and Konrad Adenauer geopolitical interests and ideologies were primary and economic motivations decidedly secondary. Such geopolitical explanations, Moravcsik argues, assume that “economic integration is not an end in itself but a means to manipulate ‘high politics’” (TCfE, p. 27). The central prediction of the geopolitical approach, in his view, is that governments tend to favor economic integration only when it is perceived to offer geopolitical benefits. If economic integration is deemed to hinder geopolitical interests, governments will oppose it (cf. TCfE, p. 29). Moravcsik challenges this prediction, arguing that the chief motivations of France, Britain, and Germany were economic. “Each government,” he writes, “sought above all to realize commercial advantages for agriculture and industry” (TCfE, p. 160). As he sees it, governments are motivated to coordinate economic policies because of the negative externalities flowing from unilateral policies, and because of the pressure exerted by domestic producers through their peak organizations (large lobbying groups consisting of smaller lobbying groups). Moravcsik believes that “one objective of foreign economic policy is to maintain and improve the competitiveness of national producers; another is to achieve regulatory objectives and limit government spending” (TCfE, p. 37). The decisions of West European states to cooperate on economic matters “should thus be preceded by pressure from domestic producers and by the overt failure of unilateral policies to achieve domestic regulatory or fiscal objectives” (TCfE, p. 37). Each government, Moravcsik argues, was motivated by commercial interests rather than by geopolitical considerations because “pressures from economic interest groups generally imposed tighter constraints on policy than did security concerns and the ideological visions of politicians and public opinion” (TCfE, pp. 6–7).

This revisionist claim, Moravcsik contends, is particularly striking with regard to de Gaulle’s European policy inasmuch as “nearly all existing accounts of de Gaulle’s European policy . . . ascribe a predominant influence to his distinctive geopolitical ideology” (TCfE, p. 177). If geopolitical accounts are to be believed, de Gaulle wanted to reinforce French grandeur and to encourage the development of a European foreign policy independent of the superpowers. Moravcsik reverses this view, arguing that de Gaulle’s central concern was not the pursuit of French grandeur but the price of French
wheat. Under pressure from farmers, de Gaulle—in Moravcsik’s depiction—consistently pursued a strategy to secure modernization of French agriculture within the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). France, in this view, could no longer afford to provide unilateral subsidies to French agriculture, and de Gaulle saw only one possible way to avoid “another Algeria on our own soil,” namely, by disposing of agricultural surpluses within a protected European market. For that reason, according to Moravcsik, de Gaulle considered the CAP his major European priority (TCfE, p. 180).

Moravcsik claims that his revisionist account explains four key decisions by de Gaulle: his acceptance of the customs union in 1958, the Fouchet Plan of 1961, the vetoing of British membership in 1963, and the “empty chair” crisis of 1965–1966. This commercial explanation is indeed at variance with prevailing explanations of de Gaulle’s policy, so let us briefly recapitulate Moravcsik’s argument concerning each of these decisions before turning to the “preponderance of evidence” he produces to support it.

Acceptance of the Customs Union
According to Moravcsik, de Gaulle’s decision in 1958 to accept and implement the Treaties of Rome for the establishment of a customs union was not motivated by his desire to build up foreign policy and defense cooperation with Germany and to create a European “third force.” Instead, de Gaulle accepted liberalization as a means to increase the competitiveness of French industry. Moreover, he wanted a customs union only if it contained a preferential arrangement for agriculture that would enable him to modernize French agriculture while passing off some of the costs to his European partners.

Fouchet Plan
In Moravcsik’s view, the Fouchet Plan for political cooperation was not “the centerpiece of de Gaulle’s geopolitical vision.” Instead, it was merely designed to underscore de Gaulle’s pro-European credentials to the other members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and to discourage them from obstructing CAP negotiations. A positive side-effect was that it made Great Britain shy away from joining the EEC. De Gaulle dropped the Fouchet Plan as soon as agriculture was “secure.” After the EEC Council of Ministers reached a decision on the CAP on 14 January 1962, de Gaulle backed away from the compromise text formulated by the Quai d’Orsay on the basis of negotiations with the EEC’s five other member-states, and he made such extensive revisions in it that he was sure the others would reject it and that negotiations would collapse.
Veto of British Membership
Moravcsik argues that de Gaulle’s veto of British membership of the EEC was not motivated by his belief that Britain was a “Trojan horse” for U.S. influence in Europe, a view that received a further boost from the Nassau deal on nuclear weapons between Macmillan and John F. Kennedy in December 1962. Despite shared Franco-British geopolitical interests (especially the need to balance Germany) and a shared aversion to supranational institutions, de Gaulle was opposed to British membership. He expected that Britain would block generous CAP financing because British agriculture was subsidized in a completely different manner and because the British maintained preferential ties with the Commonwealth. Hence, de Gaulle was opposed to British entry as long as the financial arrangement for the CAP was not fully secure.

“Empty Chair” Crisis
According to Moravcsik, de Gaulle did not suddenly turn to a more “brutal” style of negotiation and did not provoke the “empty chair” crisis in 1965 because he was suspicious of U.S. proposals for a Multilateral Force or disillusioned by the collapse of the Fouchet Plan. Instead, the general wanted to keep control over decision-making concerning CAP financing, as well as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. Therefore he blocked the adoption of qualified majority voting and maneuvered to get rid of the overly ambitious Hallstein Commission.

Moravcsik repeatedly insists that he did not find a single direct acknowledgment of geopolitical motivations for any of these four decisions (cf. TCfE, pp. 191, 194). The only countervailing evidence he cites is indirect—general discussions of French foreign policy that stress the need for European political cooperation vis-à-vis the superpowers. But, he argues, “little identifies these concerns as primary motivations for integration.” De Gaulle, he maintains, was willing to make significant geopolitical concessions and run significant geopolitical risks in order to realize the CAP (TCfE, p. 183).

11. Although this commercial explanation of de Gaulle’s European policy certainly differs from the received geopolitical view, it should be noted that Moravcsik is not as original as he might like to think. As far back as 1967, Alessandro Silj wrote in his analysis of the 1963 veto against British membership that “what Couve actually and bluntly said was that France did not believe that Great Britain was willing to accept the common agricultural policy on which the Six were in the process of agreeing, and that any special transitional arrangement, if granted by the Six, would eventually be used by the British to refuse the terms set forth by the Six for themselves.” Silj added that “the Nassau meeting . . . was hardly ‘the underlying cause’ of de Gaulle’s veto, as many have argued since.” According to Silj, de Gaulle waited until the other member states agreed to his views on agricultural policy before toughening his position on political cooperation. Moreover, Silj seems to take up a similar position as
A Deliberate Deception: Peyrefitte’s Memorandum

In addition to emphasizing a commercial interpretation, Moravcsik presents a second claim. He avers that the four decisions were all part of a consistent strategy, which de Gaulle and his associates elaborated in 1960. Moreover, they concealed this plan behind a smokescreen of pro-European and geopolitical rhetoric in order to mislead foreign and domestic critics. According to Moravcsik, the strategy worked so well that even today most analysts still “remain in the thrall of the General’s seduction” (TCfE, p. 84). The strategy was “set forth in documents and cabinet meetings in 1960–61 and carried out over the following decade almost to the letter” (TCfE, p. 177).

Unfortunately, Moravcsik does not produce any direct evidence that de Gaulle and his associates “deliberately manipulated public perceptions in order, in the words of de Gaulle’s closest associate, to ‘seduce’ observers into believing that geopolitical factors were decisive” (TCfE, p. 84). His argument on this point is based almost exclusively on a single hard, though secondary, source; namely, Edmond Jouve’s two-volume dissertation of 1967, which reproduces a memorandum and four articles in Le Monde, all written by Alain Peyrefitte in 1960. Moravcsik claims that the strategy of de Gaulle’s European policy was set out in this memorandum. Because Peyrefitte’s memorandum plays such an important role as the only evidence that supports Moravcsik’s argument, we now take a closer look at Peyrefitte’s position in de Gaulle’s government, the contents of the memorandum, and the four articles based on the memorandum that were published in Le Monde two weeks after Peyrefitte sent the document to de Gaulle.

When Peyrefitte wrote the memorandum, he was still only a Gaullist parliamentarian, “though an influential one.” Moravcsik describes Peyrefitte as de Gaulle’s “closest associate” and “chief strategist on Europe.” In his memoirs Peyrefitte offers a different picture, suggesting that de Gaulle used him strategically to ensure that the president could convey his ideas to the public without compromising himself. On European issues, Peyrefitte says he was “a straw man” for de Gaulle, “just as Christian Fouchet was.” For instance, when in January 1960 de Gaulle looked for public support for the European

Moravcsik does some thirty years later, when he affirms that “it may be said that the key problem, as far as the French attitude was concerned, was the agricultural one. This was true even apart from the general political motives, which in de Gaulle’s mind barred Great Britain’s entry into the Community” (emphasis added). Alessandro Silj, Europe’s Political Puzzle: A Study of the Fouchet Negotiations and the 1963 Veto (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1967), pp. 87–88, 90, 95–96.

12. Ibid., p. 115.
initiatives he planned to launch, his cabinet director told Peyrefitte to set up a committee for a pan-European union. The committee was to serve as a counterweight to Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe, which was anti-Gaullist and promoted a supranational Europe. Peyrefitte duly created a Gaullist pan-European union and took the initiative to edit a book of de Gaulle’s writings and speeches on Europe. The idea to compile such a book was initially approved by de Gaulle, but when the volume was almost completed he vetoed it—to Peyrefitte’s dismay. De Gaulle also used Peyrefitte on issues other than Europe. In 1961 he induced Peyrefitte to publish some newspaper articles and a book on the partition of Algeria. Peyrefitte zealously worked on the assignment until de Gaulle changed his mind and swept away “five months of hard work.” Peyrefitte bitterly concluded that de Gaulle had used him for his own ends. A further disappointment awaited Peyrefitte in April 1962, when he hoped to become state secretary of foreign affairs or state secretary of external trade in the new cabinet of Georges Pompidou. He was told that, instead, he would be spokesman of the government and state secretary of information. Moreover, de Gaulle let Peyrefitte know that even for those posts he was the second choice, as the general would have preferred Maurice Schumann. Peyrefitte’s disappointment after becoming a state secretary was complete when he discovered that de Gaulle, who had previously treated him courteously, now treated him coldly and condescendingly, like “a colonel treats his trumpet player.” All of this suggests that Peyrefitte would not recognize himself in Moravcsik’s depiction of him as de Gaulle’s “chief strategist of Europe.” We can only wonder why Moravcsik has chosen to ignore Peyrefitte’s own observations about his relationship with the general.

What are the genesis and the status of Peyrefitte’s memorandum—a document that in Moravcsik’s view provides the key to understanding Gaullist European policy? As far back as January 1960, de Gaulle had presented his main ideas on Europe to Peyrefitte: (1) Western Europe must organize itself and build a counterweight against the United States and the Soviet Union. Otherwise, Europe either would become easy prey for the USSR or would remain an American protectorate. This European Union should start with the six

15. Ibid., pp. 76, 92.  
16. Ibid., pp. 95–98.  
17. Ibid., pp. 62–64.
member-states of the EEC, without doing anything that could block the participation of others, including Britain if it “succeeded in separating itself from the Commonwealth and the United States.”

(2) Reconciliation between France and Germany was a precondition for the establishment of the European Union.

(3) The building of a confederation of European states was the exclusive task of the governments of those states.

(4) The European Union must receive popular endorsement through a referendum.

Six months later, de Gaulle invited Peyreffe for an interview to elucidate the possibilities of maintaining unanimous voting in the EEC after the transition to the common market was completed. De Gaulle’s cabinet director, René Brouillet, had pointed out to the general that Peyreffe had participated in the negotiations on the Treaties of Rome and had delivered a speech at the Quai d’Orsay in December 1957 on the preservation of the national veto. At the meeting in mid-1960, Peyreffe recommended that de Gaulle veto the transition to the third stage of the customs union (which would introduce qualified majority voting) unless the right to veto was preserved for all issues deemed of vital interest. After the conversation, de Gaulle asked Peyreffe to write him a note on the “practical means to suffocate supranationalism” and to write some articles that would vulgarize “these ideas concerning consultations between states, a confederal structure, a European referendum”—that is, de Gaulle’s ideas as set forth in his “four guidelines” of January 1960.18

We disagree with Moravcsik’s view that de Gaulle used a strategy of “deliberate deception.” For one thing, Peyreffe’s memorandum lost its confidential character almost immediately and thus its potential to deceive the uninitiated. Peyreffe’s secretary accidentally sent a copy of the memorandum, rather than a copy of the articles in Le Monde, to the French members of the liberal group in the European Parliament. When the document was published in a paper close to the European Commission, it caused a scandal because of Peyreffe’s ideas on supranationalism. A Belgian newspaper republished it on 8 February 1963.19

Furthermore, the central ideas in Peyreffe’s memorandum, including the establishment of a confederation with priority for foreign policy and defense, the organization of a referendum, and the impossibility of British mem-

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18. Ibid., p. 69. Accordingly, we disagree with Vanke that the memorandum represents Peyreffe’s “personal reflections” on these issues. See Vanke, “Reconstructing De Gaulle,” p. 92.

bership as long as Britain did not accept the existing Common Market, were by no means confidential. They were all presented in the articles in Le Monde. The only thing that was confidential was the direct style used by Peyrefitte to tell de Gaulle what not to do if he wanted to increase the chances that these ideas would gain favor. Peyrefitte warned against direct attacks on the existing institutions, risky changes of the existing treaties, and a direct refusal of British entry—actions that were more in line with de Gaulle's temperament, as the general would subsequently demonstrate by abruptly revising the Fouchet Plan, vetoing British membership in the EEC (twice), and provoking the “empty chair” crisis. Peyrefitte repeated this message in Le Monde, albeit in a positive way and “carefully sweetened” to promote Gaullist ideas on Europe.\(^\text{20}\) For instance, in the Le Monde articles he did not use the expression “to put to sleep Euratom.” Instead he referred to absorbing the existing communities in a confederal political union and eliminating double functions, a structure that left no doubt about the future position of the communities and of supranationalism.\(^\text{21}\)

In short, it is not plausible to argue either that Peyrefitte was one of de Gaulle’s closest associates or that his memorandum and articles in Le Monde prove that the French president used a strategy of “deliberate deception.”

A Close Reading of Moravcsik

We now look closely at the crucial paragraphs of Moravcsik’s argument in the section on “France: De Gaulle’s Deliberate Deception” (TCfE, pp. 186–187). We quote from the book and then offer our assessment.

*The strongest evidence for the primacy of commercial considerations, however, lies in records of strategic planning by de Gaulle and his closest advisers. De Gaulle and the man who became his chief strategist on Europe, Alain Peyrefitte, saw the apparent contradiction between French economic interests in the EC and opposition to supranational institutions as the central tactical problem facing France.*

Comment

Unfortunately, the “records of strategic planning” produced by Moravcsik remain limited to the Peyrefitte memorandum of 29 August 1960. Moreover, he fails to provide a single quotation that would substantiate the claim that de Gaulle saw the contradiction between French economic interests in the EC.

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\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 69.

and opposition to the supranational character of the EC as “the central tactical problem facing France.” De Gaulle was worried about the supranational pretensions laid down in the Treaties of Paris and Rome and about the potential subordination of France to supranational technocrats.22 Peyrefitte in his memorandum does not refer to “a tactical problem” or “a central tactical problem.” The problem he perceives is how to overcome the domestic and European resistance to de Gaulle’s project of a political union. This resistance “should not put us off, but it does impose a tactic.”23

It required what Peyrefitte termed—following de Gaulle’s language—a “prudently audacious” strategy. The core of this strategy is to be found in a plan drafted by Peyrefitte, soon to be de Gaulle’s press spokesperson and then a minister. Peyrefitte’s rapid advance within the very small group who helped make Gaullist foreign policy aside, there is direct evidence that de Gaulle immediately read and began to implement the plan.

Comment
Peyrefitte indeed suggested a prudently audacious tactic—though this was definitely not “de Gaulle’s language.” The proposed tactic was audacious insofar as France was ready to go further than the other member-states in the direction of a confederation, but it was also prudent in order not to create the impression that France wanted to dismantle the existing institutions.24 It is worth recalling that Peyrefitte drafted his memorandum at the request of de Gaulle after their conversation in July 1960. It reflected de Gaulle’s ideas, as summarized in the four guiding principles of January 1960, which were repeated by de Gaulle at a cabinet meeting on European affairs two days after his conversation with Peyrefitte. During the Franco-German meeting at Rambouillet on 29–30 July 1960 (i.e., a month before Peyrefitte sent the memorandum to de Gaulle), the French president read a note to Chancellor Adenauer containing precisely these same ideas: the organization of Europe, the curbing of supranationalism, political and defense cooperation between states, and the holding of a referendum.25

As far as Peyrefitte’s career is concerned, we have already made clear that Peyrefitte himself had expected that his “advance” would be much more

24. Ibid.
“rapid” than it actually was. Unlike Moravcsik, we do not know of any “direct evidence that de Gaulle immediately read and began to implement the plan.” We do know, however, from Peyrefitte himself, that de Gaulle never discussed the memorandum with him. The cabinet director of Maurice Couve de Murville told Peyrefitte “casually” that the “report was studied with interest.” Moravcsik apparently has based his claim on Jouve, who made the following comment about the document and its genesis:

[Peyrefitte] in a note dated 29 August 1960 (addressed to M. Debré, by the way) describes the tactics that could be followed by France in the European negotiations. At the press conference of 5 September 1960, general de Gaulle will use, putting his personal stamp on them, some of the ideas contained in this document.27

Jouve apparently did not know it was de Gaulle who had told Peyrefitte to write the note.

*The rest of this extraordinary strategy, which hinted at all the major developments of the EEC from 1960 through 1966, was set forth explicitly in other confidential documents, negotiating instructions, and cabinet discussions during this period.*

**Comment**

Moravcsik’s sentence ends with a superscript “65,” but footnote 65 does not refer to any “other confidential documents” and “negotiating instructions.” It refers only to Peyrefitte’s memorandum (reprinted in Jouve’s book) and to Michel Debré’s memoirs. Perhaps we should consider the episode sketched in Debré’s memoirs as a reflection of cabinet discussions, but we still see no elaboration of what Moravcsik describes as an “extraordinary strategy.” Debré, in fact, recalls that the government in 1960 debated whether France could afford a further reduction of customs duties in the context of the Common Market or should delay the transition to the second stage. Couve de Murville argued against delay. Debré was ambivalent and consulted eight senior colleagues and experts, though Peyrefitte was not among them. After this round of consultation, Debré accepted Couve de Murville’s point of view, on the condition that the customs union was provided with a common external tariff, an agricultural agreement, and the integration of French overseas territories.28

Peyrefitte argued that the French government must disguise its true goals, agricultural modernization and undermining supranational institutions; France must strive "never to appear negative."

Comment
Peyrefitte did not argue that the French government must “disguise its true goals.” He merely said that the government must defend its ideas more cleverly, as the other countries did in pursuing their objectives behind a “verbal curtain—ceaseless proclamations of faith in favor of European integration, and criticisms of France because of its reservations with respect to that same integration.” Moreover, Peyrefitte does not mention “agricultural modernization” at all. He refers to agriculture three times. First, he warns against revision of the treaty because it could compromise the CAP, “to which we attach most importance.” Second, he writes that “the new structure . . . in the economic domain . . . would in the first place deal with the problems that are only touched upon in the Treaties of Rome (in case of failure of the common agricultural policy).” Third, he argues that the CAP will not be adopted until there is enough political will.

To keep negotiations moving and to avoid triggering counter demands and obstruction from its allies on economic issues, France must avoid conveying any inkling of its desire to destroy EC institutions in pursuit of its true goal: “a British Europe without the British.”

Comment
France did not have a furtive desire to destroy the existing European institutions. On the contrary, Peyrefitte argued that destruction of the institutions was unnecessary because they did not amount to anything substantial, and he urged the government not to give the impression that it was out to destroy them. Other countries, he pointed out, already suspected France of such plans, and any confirmation of their suspicions would endanger the prospects of French plans for consolidation of the economic union and the institution of a political union. Peyrefitte did not refer to France’s “true goal.” He contended that de Gaulle’s project would succeed only if the French did not give the impression “that they want to make Europe in the British way without the British.” There was no deception in this. After all, de Gaulle’s plans for Europe did indeed differ from those of the British.

“"To appreciate the deception,” Moravcsik adds in note 66, “compare

30. Ibid., pp. 492–493.
31. Ibid., p. 490.
Peyrefitte’s articles in *Le Monde* (14, 15, 16, and 17 September 1960), which argue that it would be illogical to seek “a British Europe without the British.” Actually, only the article of 17 September is relevant here. In it, Peyrefitte argues that the Six (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) seem to face a dilemma. On the one hand, they could decide to go further than Britain could, but then they would risk being accused of adding a political gap to the economic gap. On the other hand, they could opt for a system without supranationality and irreversibility, but then they would have to invite Great Britain to participate “inasmuch as it would be illogical to make Europe the British way without the British.” Peyrefitte wondered, however, whether it was really “possible to include Great Britain in a system that has as one of its crucial aims to enable the success of the community of the Six by realizing its political potential if Great Britain continues not to accede to the Common Market?”

For our purposes here, the point to emphasize is that no deception was involved. There was no contradiction between the memorandum and the 17 September article in *Le Monde*.

Any hint of de Gaulle’s plan to destroy EC institutions would disadvantage the French or lead the other five to side with the British. France should instead, in Peyrefitte’s words, “seduce” the other five governments away from the EC by proposing positive plans that did not undermine sovereignty, such as the Fouchet Plan.

Comment
First, as we have already explained, de Gaulle did not have a plan to destroy existing EC institutions. His preoccupation was to avoid having the five other member-states turn the institutions into a federal government above the national governments to the detriment of French interests. Second, Peyrefitte did not use the word *seduce*, nor did he suggest seducing other governments away from the EC. Instead, he simply asked: “Why not limit ourselves, at least for the time being, to presenting French proposals in their most attractive form?” Third, how can Peyrefitte possibly have referred to the Fouchet Plan, when it did not even exist yet? (It was drawn up more than a year later.)

Such plans were needed to create the illusion of a positive French policy toward Europe and thereby to assure forward motion on economic issues and, if possible, to induce other governments to renounce the EC voluntarily.

Comment
Peyrefitte formulated conditions that would increase the chances of success for Gaullist European projects (political union, confederation). These condi-

32. Ibid., p. 439.
33. Ibid., p. 492.
tions were not intended to create an illusion; they fully corresponded to de Gaulle’s “guiding principles,” which stipulated that an economic union without a political union would not suffice. At no point did Peyrefitte argue that these plans were meant “to induce other governments to renounce the EC voluntarily.”

Perhaps, the Peyrefitte memo cynically speculated, this policy might persuade European federalists, who comprised a majority in many national parliaments, that “the President of the Republic had been ‘converted’ to their principles.”

Comment
What Peyrefitte actually wrote is that French proposals had to be formulated in a way that would make the French government seem more anxious than the others to further the cause of European unity. As he put it:

Let us allow our partners to believe or pretend to believe that the president of the Republic and the French government are converted to their theses. In this way the scholastic quibbling between “Europeans” and “anti-Europeans,” between “little Europe” and “big Europe,” between “federation” and “confederation” will be over, the union will be built, federalists could join the French projects without losing face; our partners could no longer shy away from them; in France and especially in Parliament, where “Europeans” have a clear majority, the opposition would lose one of its trump cards, and the majority would be consolidated.34

Far from being cynical speculation, this is the evocation of a bright future. Moreover, the expression “a majority in many national parliaments” is certainly not found in the memorandum.

For nearly two years, it has precisely this effect on none other than Monnet, who supported de Gaulle’s plans for foreign policy coordination until the General’s true intentions became clear.

Comment
Moravcsik apparently is unaware that as far back as 25 August 1959 Monnet had written de Gaulle a letter urging the general to establish a Franco-German union that would be the core of an independent Europe. In an interview with de Gaulle three weeks later, the latter stated that he agreed with the goal of a European Union but that he was afraid that the time was not yet ripe.35 In

34. Ibid., p. 489.
May 1960, eleven days after de Gaulle publicly announced his desire to promote European cooperation, Monnet explained to Chancellor Adenauer that the presence of leaders like de Gaulle in France and Adenauer in West Germany afforded Europe a unique opportunity. Three years later, when Monnet distanced himself from the plans for a Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation, “he found himself in the paradoxical situation of fighting against precisely what he three years earlier had recommended as the key to the solution of Europe’s problems.”

A final added benefit was greater pressure on Britain: the apparent “deepening” of integration, de Gaulle and his associates speculated, might force the British mistakenly to “exclude themselves” from a superficially federalist arrangement. France would of course have to block British entry to achieve the CAP. If the French stalled and made demands, de Gaulle wrongly calculated, British negotiators—too tightly constrained by agricultural and Commonwealth interests in the Conservative party—would be forced either to withdraw or to bargain so intransigently that they would be blamed for a collapse of negotiations. The Fouchet Plan would place even greater pressure on Britain. The apparent “deepening” of integration, de Gaulle and his associates reasoned, might force the British mistakenly to “exclude themselves” from a superficially federalist, but actually more “British” arrangement.

Comment
It is not clear why Moravcsik repeated the sentence at the beginning of this paragraph almost verbatim a few sentences later, but doing so does not make his claim more correct. Contrary to what Moravcsik would have us believe, Peyrefitte did not argue in favor of any sort of federal arrangement. Peyrefitte explained that the proposed formula “has to be bold enough to make them [the British] back out.” The political union he envisaged was not a “superficially federalist arrangement” but an open-ended confederal treaty. Peyrefitte supposed that such a daring proposal would bring to light the underlying British fears that “a European confederation will establish with the United States a dialogue in which Great Britain would no longer be able to claim the privileged role of intermediary that she tries so hard to play.” The British had to be “driven to the alternative of joining the Union of the Six without restrictions or remaining in the margin but without being able to complain anymore that they have been kept out.”

39. Ibid., p. 496.
We conclude this section by briefly examining one other claim by Moravcsik about the “empty chair” crisis. He asserts that de Gaulle’s attack against the Commission in 1965 “had been planned for years, first appearing as the backup to the Fouchet Plan in Peyrefitte’s strategy document of 1960–61” (TCfE, p. 194). If we are to believe Peyrefitte’s account of these events, the “empty chair” crisis was not in fact “planned.” On 28 July 1965, Peyrefitte observed to de Gaulle that “actually, you want, at the occasion of that crisis, to regain what you tried to do in ’61 with the Fouchet Plan, proposing European cooperation organized outside the Brussels Commission.” De Gaulle agreed that in 1961 he had sought an organized form of cooperation that would prevent “Brussels” from taking important economic decisions without the approval of France. Now he wanted to settle the issue by eliminating the possibility of majority voting provided for in the Treaty of Rome. When Peyrefitte inquired whether the Five, by rejecting the French financial proposals, had fallen into a trap, de Gaulle denied it: “We have not laid a trap. They have laid it themselves. . . . For us, it is an unexpected pretext.”

This further illustrates the main point we have sought to demonstrate in this section—namely, that Moravcsik has seriously misread Peyrefitte and Jouve, the two sources on which he has based his revisionist commercial interpretation of de Gaulle’s European policy.

Revisionism Revised

In 2000, only two years after the publication of his path-breaking book, Moravcsik published a lengthy two-part article on de Gaulle’s European policy in the Journal of Cold War Studies. The article, he wrote, “extends the brief treatment” of Gaullist policy in TCfE. The journal also published a forum with responses to the article from six distinguished scholars and a reply by Moravcsik that defended the claims he made in both the article and the book. In the article Moravcsik claimed that “most documentary and circumstantial evidence suggests that the primary goals underlying French policy . . . were not the grandeur and military security of France,” but the achievement of “preferential commercial advantages for French industry and agriculture.”

The causal mechanism in Moravcsik’s commercial explanation of
Gaullle’s policy is the influence that agricultural producers supposedly exerted through their peak organizations. But there are two weaknesses in this argument. First, as Stanley Hoffmann and Jeffrey Vanke point out in their commentaries on Moravcsik’s article, Moravcsik fails to produce convincing evidence that agricultural producers exerted decisive influence through their peak organizations. Second, when discussing agriculture, Moravcsik frequently mixes up three different kinds of mechanism: (1) “economic constraints,” (2) elections (which turn out to be part of the “economic constraints” in Moravcsik’s theory), and (3) peak organizations. The first mechanism does not necessarily presuppose a commercial explanation and indeed fits well in a mercantilist explanation: De Gaulle was concerned about France’s huge agricultural surpluses and saw the CAP as one of his highest priorities because he was worried about the French position in the world. The second mechanism—concerns about the electorate—also does not presuppose a commercial view. Only the third type of mechanism is specific to a commercial explanation. This conflation of mechanisms is probably attributable to the “underspecified theory of domestic interest group influence” that, with hindsight, Moravcsik himself considers to be “the central theoretical weakness of my argument in this article—and to some extent the book from which it derives.”

In this section we first discuss the empirical problems with Moravcsik’s revisionist argument about de Gaulle’s relationship with French agricultural peak organizations. We then briefly review the epistemological problems posed by Moravcsik’s revision of his revisionism in his article and rejoinder in the *Journal of Cold War Studies*.

**An Empirical Weakness**

We begin by briefly reconstructing events during the “empty chair” crisis of 1965–1966, when the power of French farmers, according to Moravcsik, was “demonstrated” (TCfE, p. 180). Moravcsik does not produce any documentary evidence to show the influence of interest groups on de Gaulle’s European policy, so we rely here on Peyrefitte’s account. Peyrefitte describes how in June 1965, two weeks before the crisis started, de Gaulle made a tour of the countryside. On this occasion, two “grands patrons” of French agricul-

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ture (Louis Rémond, president of the chamber of agriculture, and André Marteau, president of the leading French farmers’ union, the Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA), told him that the farmers were worried about the negotiations because “we are very much Europeans.” De Gaulle was furious: “And me, am I not a European? Don’t you know that the government defends by all means the interests of French agriculture?” Marteau warned that his union would seize the opportunity to demonstrate that farmers and the rural population represented a quarter of the electorate. A week later, during a meeting of the French Cabinet, de Gaulle rejected Prime Minister Pompidou’s suggestion that they reassure the farm lobby that the government was firmly committed to the defense of French agriculture. Instead, the president disparaged the farmers’ representatives as “demagogues of agriculture” and ordered his ministers to tell them to get lost.45

On 8 September 1965, the day before de Gaulle’s press conference on the crisis, Peyrefitte informed de Gaulle that the farm unions had reproached him for having started the crisis not to defend their interests but to raise a new political problem, that of the majority vote in the Council of Ministers. What the farmers apparently failed to understand was that the introduction of majority voting could jeopardize everything that had been gained for French agriculture. In any case, de Gaulle was not swayed. He insisted that he was responsible to France as a whole, not just to the farmers’ unions, and that France would understand his actions.46

It is impossible to reconcile these comments by de Gaulle, as recorded by Peyrefitte, with Moravcsik’s thesis that “on not a single major issue did governments take a position openly opposed by a major peak industrial, financial, or agricultural interest group” (TCfE, pp. 475–476). As Vanke rightly observes, Moravcsik “could argue that de Gaulle was doing what was best for the farmers’ commercial interests even if they did not understand it. But this would mean that de Gaulle was acting on an independent assessment of what would be beneficial for agriculture, and that he was, in fact, free to make decisions without succumbing to the pressure of commercial interests.”47

On several occasions Peyrefitte expressed concern that farmers would not vote for de Gaulle in the upcoming presidential election. De Gaulle brushed aside these worries: “I am not going to sabotage our efforts to impose the

46. Ibid., p. 298.
Agricultural Common Market against the unanimity of our five partners simply because there are farmers who do not understand, or because their leaders do not want to understand anything.”

Two weeks before the election, during a hunting party, Peyrefitte was told by farmers in his constituency that they would vote for the centrist candidate Jean Lecanuet during the first round of the election: “Of course, during the second round we will vote for de Gaulle. But in the first round, we want to give him a fright.” They succeeded in this quest. De Gaulle had expected to win on the first round, and he was dismayed that he had not convinced a majority of the French population to vote for him.

After this debacle, de Gaulle’s advisers persuaded the general to use the media in a different and more informal way. But it is not accurate to say, as Moravcsik does, that de Gaulle “refocused his message and further restrained his anti-European rhetoric” in order to win back the farmers’ vote. Instead, as the main French political yearbook noted at the time, the general on television “even went so far as to jump up and down on his chair in order to ridicule those who ‘jump on their chair like a goat’ saying ‘Europe, Europe, Europe.’” Concerning agriculture and the Brussels negotiations, de Gaulle stated that he was ready to resume negotiations “provided that, of course, they would wind things up and would not try to adorn the entry of French agriculture in the Common Market... with political conditions... that, from a French point of view, are not acceptable.” The general, as the yearbook pointed out, “did not renounce any of his fundamental positions.”

According to Peyrefitte, de Gaulle interpreted his second-round victory as a rejection of supranational Europe: “Nobody wants it! It is the defeat of the so-called ‘Europeans.’” A month later in Luxembourg the “empty chair” crisis was resolved through an agreement by the six member-states to disagree. De Gaulle was pleased by the results achieved in Luxembourg: “The common agricultural market is installed. Hallstein and his Commission are gone. Supranationality has disappeared. France remains sovereign.”

None of this lends support to Moravcsik’s thesis that de Gaulle was influenced by the FNSEA and changed his European policy because of the farmers. In the rejoinder to his critics, Moravcsik concedes that he did “not

49. Ibid., p. 596.
53. Ibid., p. 620.
provide as much direct evidence that ‘interest group pressures played important roles in these issues’ as one would like,” and that he left “largely unexamined the process by which economic cause became political effect.” He remains convinced, however, that “there is still substantial evidence of direct interest group influence,” although, again, he fails to produce any source to substantiate this conviction.\footnote{Moravcsik, “Beyond Grain and Grandeur,” pp. 138–139; emphasis in original.}

**Epistemological Problems**

In his article in the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Moravcsik observes that “to the extent that the general may have sought to realize geopolitical and visionary goals through European integration, he did so under such exceedingly narrow economic constraints that his individual geopolitical vision was reduced to a secondary, largely insignificant, role.” Moravcsik here is no longer assuming, as he did in TCfE, p. 36, that de Gaulle’s decisions were directly swayed by domestic producers through their peak organizations. Instead, he is arguing that de Gaulle was motivated by a more nebulous “concern about pressure from producer groups and their partisan supporters.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 135.} Clearly this new causal mechanism is less straightforward than the original one. One can easily imagine situations in which policymakers, despite being deeply concerned about the potential repercussions of their decisions on powerful interest groups, proceed with what they believe is best for the society as a whole. At first glance this description seems to fit de Gaulle, but here we are confronted by the problem that, as we saw above, he was not particularly concerned about the pressure exerted by the agricultural lobby. If, as Moravcsik claims, economic interests predominated, we would have expected to find that de Gaulle was obsessed about pressure from farmers’ groups, but what we actually find is that he was largely indifferent. This implies that, with regard to de Gaulle’s European policy, even Moravcsik’s more indirect causal mechanism is still inconsistent with the facts.

Moravcsik perhaps would be prepared to concede that Peyrefitte’s recollections do not contain evidence of the general’s concern about agricultural peak organizations but would object that this is too specific an interpretation of the “exceedingly narrow economic constraints” within which the general

\footnote{Moravcsik, “De Gaulle (Part 1),” p. 6.}

\footnote{Ibid., p. 21.}
had to operate. Moravcsik might well argue that the causal mechanism he proposes to explain de Gaulle’s policy is broader and more circumstantial, offering “a more nuanced multicausal thesis.”58 But if he were to make this argument, it would seriously weaken his commercial theory by reducing its empirical content. The causal mechanism proposed in TCfE cannot be substantiated unless Moravcsik provides evidence that producers actually intervened in the decision-making process and that the government changed its policies as a result. If, instead, we find that policy change occurred without intervention; or that intervention did not lead to policy change, we can take his argument to be falsified. It is also possible to reject the “thin” interpretation of the mechanism proposed in his article if we find no evidence that de Gaulle’s policies were motivated by a concern about pressure from producer groups.

What about the “thick” interpretation of the causal mechanism proposed in Moravcsik’s article? Can it be rejected on the basis of empirical observations? Unfortunately, empirical tests may well be infeasible. Moravcsik’s argument seems to degenerate into the assertion that the objectives pursued by de Gaulle—“to assuage powerful interest groups, prevent domestic disorder, garner electoral support, modernize the French economy, and stabilize government finances”—imposed such strong constraints that they must have influenced his decisions, even if we do not find direct evidence of such influence.59 This brings us to a second epistemological problem. By introducing “exceedingly narrow economic constraints” as a causal mechanism, Moravcsik obviously is seeking to tone down his original claim. But the paradox is that he actually ends up making an even stronger claim. In his article in the Journal of Cold War Studies, Moravcsik emphasizes that he does not want to get involved in the polemical debate regarding geopolitics versus economics. He declares that “this essay addresses not the question of whether de Gaulle’s policy was ultimately geopolitical or economic, but the narrower problem of whether the proximate cause of de Gaulle’s policy was geopolitical or economic.”60 Moravcsik contends that, when seen in this perspective, “the motivations for governments to promote the EEC are more commercial and less geopolitical than is commonly supposed.”61 At the same time, he insists

61. Moravcsik, “De Gaulle (Part 2),” p. 64. In this connection we should not fail to mention Moravcsik’s own intriguing elaboration of the “economic constraints.” He claims that de Gaulle’s “first priority was to maintain his electoral position in France, which required the satisfaction of powerful...
that "the pursuit of mundane agricultural and industrial interests, combined with domestic economic reforms, constitutes a predominant influence on and sufficient explanation of French policy toward the EEC under de Gaulle." By arguing that commercial interests are sufficient to explain French policies, Moravcsik—whether he realizes it or not—is making the strongest claim possible. If a condition is deemed to be sufficient, then its presence guarantees a particular outcome (which also implies, in our view, that it is superfluous to state, as Moravcsik does numerous times, that commercial considerations are predominant (or primary) and sufficient). If commercial interests are indeed sufficient to explain French European policy, then it would not have mattered whether Charles de Gaulle or, say, Jean Monnet had been the first president of the Fifth Republic. This notion leaves scant room for nuance.

**Conclusion**

Andrew Moravcsik’s revisionist “commercial” interpretation of de Gaulle’s European policy does not stand up under scrutiny. His interpretation suffers from soft sources and weak evidence. This conclusion is based on the following four considerations. First, the sources Moravcsik used in support of his argument in the section “France: De Gaulle’s Deliberate Deception” are of lower quality and “softer” than he led readers to expect. Second, Moravcsik’s handling of these sources is poor. Only 24 percent of the 221 references we have been able to check are unproblematic and fully correct. Together, these two weaknesses indicate that, if judged by methodological criteria, Moravcsik’s revisionist interpretation cannot be considered more reliable than other interpretations. Third, Moravcsik’s twofold claim—that de Gaulle’s European policy was motivated by economic considerations and that de Gaulle concealed these motivations from others by using pro-European and geopolitical rhetoric in a strategy of “deliberate deception”—has not been substantiated. Fourth, Moravcsik has failed to produce any direct evidence to support his claim in *The Choice for Europe* that de Gaulle’s European policy was decisively influenced by agricultural interests through their peak organizations. Moravcsik’s awareness of this problem evidently prompted him to

domestic economic constituencies, notably large farmers and industrialists.” See Moravcsik, “De Gaulle, (Part 2),” p. 54. Moravcsik seems to launch a completely new (and quite unicausal!) theory here: de Gaulle was driven by electoral strategies. As we already demonstrated, there is no convincing evidence that de Gaulle’s first priority was to maintain his electoral position.

modify his revisionist thesis in his article and rejoinder in the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, but his discussion there raised further problems. The modification of his thesis leads, on the one hand, to a decrease in the empirical content of his theory and, on the other hand, to an even stronger claim regarding the theory’s explanatory power.

**Acknowledgment**

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**Appendix I: Quality of Sources Used by Moravcsik**

Note: Where Moravcsik mistakenly cites the names of authors or the titles of books, chapters, or articles, we have corrected them without further comment. We counted Vol. 1 and Vol. 2 of Jouve (1967) as separate books, Vol. 1 as a soft secondary source (SS), and Vol. 2 as a hard secondary source (HS). The other categories are hard primary sources (HP) and soft primary sources (SP).

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<th>HS</th>
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<td>AAPBD, *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-</td>
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<td>land 1963* (Munich, 1994)</td>
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<td>Alexandre, Philippe, <em>The Duel: De Gaulle and Pompidou</em> (Boston,</td>
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<td>1972)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balassa, Carol Levy, “Organized Industry in France and the Euro-</td>
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<td>pean Common Market: Interest Group Attitudes and Behavior”</td>
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<td>(Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1978)</td>
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<td>1993)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bodenheimer, Susanne J., *Political Union: A Microcosm of European</td>
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Appendix I (Continued)

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<td>Camps, Miriam, <em>European Unification in the 1960s: From the Veto to the Crisis</em> (New York, 1966)</td>
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<td>Cogan, Charles, <em>Charles de Gaulle: A Brief Biography with Documents</em> (Boston, 1995)</td>
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<td>Cogan, Charles, <em>Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France since 1940</em> (Westport, CT, 1994)</td>
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<td>Grosser, Alfred, <em>French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle</em> (Boston, 1967)</td>
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<td>Hoffmann, Stanley, ed., <em>Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s</em> (New York, 1974)</td>
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<td>Kusterer, Hermann, <em>Der Kanzler und der General</em> (Stuttgart, 1995)</td>
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<td>Lasok, D., and P. Soldatos, eds., <em>The European Communities in Action</em> (Brussels, 1981)</td>
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<td>Noël, Émile, &quot;Quelques aspects institutionnels de la crise des communautés: Le fonctionnement des institutions pendant la crise,&quot; lecture before the International Faculty for the Teaching of Comparative Law (Brussels, 15 September 1966)</td>
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<td>Peyrefitte, Alain, <em>The Trouble with France</em> (New York, 1980)</td>
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<td>Roth, Andrew, <em>Heath and the Heathmen</em> (London, 1972)</td>
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<td>Spinelli, Altiero, The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis in the European Community (Baltimore, 1966)</td>
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<td>Willis, F. Roy, France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945–1967 (Stanford, 1968)</td>
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<td>Willis, F. Roy, ed., European Integration (New York, 1975)</td>
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<td>Ziegler, Philip, Wilson, the Authorized Biography (London, 1995)</td>
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<td><strong>Total: 62</strong></td>
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Appendix II: Handling of Sources by Moravcsik

c = correct; pc = partly correct; nc = not correct; nh = note however; ia = inaccurate (for explanations of how the terms are applied, see the section in the text titled “Handling of Sources”)

**Note no.**

37 contains Moravcsik’s evaluation of several memoirs of Charles de Gaulle’s ministers; of Peyrefitte’s C’était de Gaulle, only the first volume was published in 1994, not both; note, moreover, that contrary to what Moravcsik claims, it was not Alain Peyrefitte and the prime minister who were permitted to take notes at de Gaulle’s cabinet meetings, but Peyrefitte and the two secretaries-general (Peyrefitte 1994, p. 104).

37 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference I, 303, is correct. ia

38 de Gaulle [SP]: reference is correct. c
39 de Gaulle [HP]: reference 4:170 is not correct; in his memorandum of December 1941, or January 1942, de Gaulle does not speak of retaining France’s “independence and its grandeur,” but of being assured that the U.S. intervention to restore French national cohesion will be inspired solely by the desire to reestablish France’s independence and grandeur; inasmuch as France’s existence is necessary for the world’s equilibrium.

39 Pisani [SP], reference 86–88 is not correct; Edgard Pisani does not discuss de Gaulle’s observations about France; instead, he discusses the general’s observations about Europe (de Gaulle had “a certain idea of Europe”).

40 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference 153 (read I, 153); and Cogan [SS]: reference 140: both references are partly correct, as neither Peyrefitte nor Charles Cogan refers to “the past 800 years” of European history.


41 Ménil [SS]: reference 15–54 is not correct; Lois Pattison de Ménil does not discuss de Gaulle’s opposition to the EDC and Euratom, his cancellation of secret Franco-German cooperation on nuclear weapons, or his criticism of U.S. foreign economic policy; instead, she refers to de Gaulle’s proposal to reform the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

41 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 182ff. is not correct; de Gaulle indeed criticizes the ambivalence of the Community, yet none of the quotations used by Moravcsik appears on these pages.

41 Macmillan–de Gaulle conversation [HP]: we were not able to check PRSM (read PREM).

41 Leprette [SS]: reference 188 is correct; note, however, that unlike de Gaulle, Jacques Leprette believes that the Rome Treaty is “something other than an improved treaty of commerce.”

42 Jouve [HS]: reference 455 is not correct; it deals with a “nouveau projet de traité adopté par la commission [Fouchet] avec des redactions alternatives,” March 1962.

42 Jouve [HS]: reference 492–498 is not correct; Peyrefitte does not refer to the geopolitical positions of France and Britain as “sisters”; he addresses the paradox that “the Europe we wish to construct, does it not resemble, like a sister (at least in the eyes of the public), the Europe that England has never ceased to recommend since 1948?” (Jouve II, p. 495).
Appendix II (Continued)

Note no.

42 Macmillan-de Gaulle conversation, see note 41.

43 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference I, 302, is correct.

44 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference I, 302–303, is correct.

44 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference I, 67, is not correct; Peyrefitte does not refer to a deal between French agriculture and German industry or to British entry in the Common Market; instead, he relates de Gaulle's observations about the absurdity of supranationality.

44 Balassa [SS]: reference is not correct; Carol Balassa discusses the effects of trade liberalization in the framework of the Pinay-Rueff Plan on French industry.

44 de Gaulle [SP]: reference Mémoires, (read Memoirs of Hope), reference 158–159, is not correct; de Gaulle does not refer to a deal between French agriculture and German industry or to British entry into the Common Market.

44 Willis [SS]: reference 252–253 is not correct; F. Roy Willis discusses the modernization of French industry, not the deal between French agriculture and German industry.

44 Willis [SS]: reference 287ff. is correct.

44 Jouve [HS]: reference 492–498 is not correct; in his memo Peyrefitte does not discuss a possible Franco-German deal on agriculture and industry and also does not discuss a free trade area (FTA).

44 Debré [SP]: reference Trois, 2:432–434 (read 3:432–434) is correct.

44 Lacouture [SS]: reference De Gaulle (read De Gaulle: The Ruler), 212, is not correct; Jean Lacouture does not discuss EC affairs; instead, he refers to an agreement with Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and the decision to suspend the provision of information on nuclear energy to Italy and Germany.

44 Institut [SS]: reference 126–130 is not correct; does not discuss a possible Franco-German deal on agriculture and industry and does not discuss an FTA.


44 Institut [SS]: reference 137–138 is not correct; compares the Rueff Plan with earlier ones, such as the Monnet Plan of 1946 and the Faure Plan of 1954.
Appendix II (Continued)

Note no.

44 **Institut [SS]**: reference 126–127 is not correct; discusses Rueff’s ideas to control the money supply.

44 **Jouve [HS]**: reference 195 is not correct; Edmond Jouve reproduces some notes from spring 1953.

44 **Poidevin [HS]**: reference 79–87 is not correct; Raymond Poidevin does not discuss French agriculture.

44 **Peyrefitte [SS]**: reference 39 is not correct; Peyrefitte does not here discuss an FTA or a possible Franco-German deal on agriculture and industry.

44 **Prate [SP]**: reference 64 is not correct; Alain Prate does not discuss a possible Franco-German deal; note that on p. 63, Prate explains that "political aspects" were "without doubt primordial" in de Gaulle’s decision to block British entry, although the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) also played an important role.

44 **Rueff [SP]**: reference 252–256 is not correct; Jacques Rueff does not discuss agriculture or the European Economic Community (EEC).

44 **Rueff [SP]**: reference 458–464 is not correct; Rueff discusses the causes of France’s excess purchasing power.

45 **Interview with French ofªcial**: reference cannot be checked.

45 **de Gaulle [SP]**: reference 217–220 is not correct; de Gaulle does not discuss the loss of the "rural vote"; he discusses the British membership application.

46 **Willis [SS]**: reference 253ff. is not correct; Willis discusses the situation before the signing of the Rome Treaties, not after de Gaulle’s return to power; no mention is made of the FTA plan or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

47 **Peyrefitte [HP]**: reference 1, 211, is not correct; Peyrefitte relates the aftermath of an attempt to assassinate de Gaulle in August 1962.

47 **de Gaulle [SP]**: reference 183ff. (read 182) is correct.

47 **Jouve [SS]**: reference 194ff. is not correct insofar as Jouve, in his discussion of de Gaulle’s choice for Europe in 1958, does not deal with agriculture.

47 **Jebb (read Gladwyn) [SP]**: reference 310 (read 309–310) is correct.
Appendix II (Continued)

Note no.

47 Silj [SS]: reference 114–116 is not correct; Alessandro Silj does not discuss de Gaulle’s turnaround in 1958; on p. 116 Silj notes Michel Debré’s 1957 declaration that the Treaty of Rome was illegal, but he does not say that Debré called for renunciation on the grounds that it was “inconsistent with Gaullist views on federalism.”

47 Institut [SS]: reference is not correct; discusses the Rueff Plan, not de Gaulle’s view on the EEC Treaty.

48 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 177–178 is correct.

48 Interview Snoy et d’Oppuers: we were unable to check reference.

49 Institut [SS]: reference is correct.

50 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 131ff. is not correct; de Gaulle does not confirm the “primacy of economic interests” but defends himself against the charge that he has been indifferent to economic and social matters.

50 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 159 is not correct; de Gaulle discusses the potential importance of the Common Market for French agriculture, but he does not refer to agriculture as the major problem facing France.

50 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 178 is not correct; de Gaulle invites Konrad Adenauer to support the French position with respect to agriculture and British membership in the EEC.

50 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 182–83 is not correct; no mention of cabinet meetings on EC issues; instead de Gaulle says that in the Rome Treaty industrial provisions were as precise “as those concerning agriculture were vague.”

50 Institut [SS]: reference is correct.

50 Jouve [SS]: reference is not correct; no reference to the Plan Rueff appears here.

50 Maillard [SS]: reference 142 is correct.

50 Jebb (read Gladwyn) [SP]: reference 310 is not correct; Lord Gladwyn does not discuss agriculture or the Plan Rueff here.

51 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 231–232, is correct.

51 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 274 and passim, is not correct; Peyrefitte relates de Gaulle’s view that the rise in cereal prices resulting from the December 1964 agreement is 8 percent and not 15 percent, as had been reported in the press.
Appendix II (Continued)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Note no.</th>
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<tr>
<td>52 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 135 is correct.</td>
<td>c</td>
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<tr>
<td>52 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 159 is correct.</td>
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<tr>
<td>52 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 171 is not correct; de Gaulle does not discuss agriculture; he says that France can &quot;survive only in the first rank of nations&quot; and that this is what he aims for in the arena of Europe; he also says that a united Europe should lead not to a fusion of its peoples but to a concert of European States, which might evolve into a confederation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>52 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 173 is not correct; de Gaulle does not discuss agriculture; instead, he refers to Germany's future role in Europe and the complementary nature of the Gauls and the Teutons.</td>
<td>nc</td>
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<tr>
<td>52 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 174–180 is not correct; de Gaulle reports on his first meeting with Adenauer at Colombey-les-deux-Églises, during which they discussed Franco-German cooperation, NATO, and Berlin.</td>
<td>nc</td>
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<tr>
<td>53 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 267, is correct.</td>
<td>c</td>
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<tr>
<td>54 Prate [SP]: reference 52 and 53ff. (read 52ff.) is correct.</td>
<td>c ia</td>
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<tr>
<td>55 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 265, is correct.</td>
<td>c</td>
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<tr>
<td>55 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 237, is correct.</td>
<td>c</td>
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<tr>
<td>55 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 264–266, is partly correct; on p. 264 the Franco-German relationship with respect to the CAP is discussed.</td>
<td>pc</td>
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<tr>
<td>55 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 271–274, is not correct; Peyrefitte relates discussions on the cereal price agreement in December 1964.</td>
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<tr>
<td>55 Camps [SS]: reference 86–87 is not correct; Miriam Camps discusses Maurice Couve de Murville’s 20 October 1965 speech to the French National Assembly, not de Gaulle’s vision of a trade conflict between France and the Anglo-Americans.</td>
<td>nc</td>
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<td>55 Camps [SS]: reference 91 is not correct; Camps discusses Couve de Murville’s statement that “events might well have taken a different turn if the French proposals on political union had been accepted.”</td>
<td>nc</td>
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Appendix II (Continued)

Note no.

55 Hoffmann [SS]: reference 296–297 is not correct; Stanley Hoffmann does not state that differences in trade policy between the United States and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and France, on the other, were the primary motivations for de Gaulle’s European policies.

55 Hoffmann [SS]: reference 388–389 is not correct; Hoffmann does not discuss trade policy issues here.

56 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 222, is not correct; de Gaulle tells Peyrefitte of Adenauer’s fears that the Americans will refuse to use nuclear weapons for the defense of Germany and how Adenauer prevented Ludwig Erhard from coming to Paris for the signing of the Franco-German Cooperation Treaty.

56 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 265 (read 263–264) is correct.

57 Camps [SS]: reference 16 is partly correct; Camps points to French pressure on Germany to forsake the Multilateral Force (MLF), but she also discusses French pressure for a common cereal price as “a test of the ‘Europeanism’ of the Germans.”

57 Camps [SS]: reference 117 is not correct; Camps does not mention “brutal” negotiating tactics or “Kennedy’s proposals for the MLF” here; note, moreover, that this page reference is inconsistent with the one in n. 89.

58 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 231–232, is correct.

58 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 237, is not correct; Peyrefitte records Adenauer’s farewell meeting at Rambouillet in September 1963 but makes no link between agricultural issues and geopolitical issues.

58 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 245–246, is not correct; de Gaulle states that the Five must accept that the CAP is a necessary consequence of the Rome Treaty; he also observes that he does not demand that Erhard choose between France and the United States.

58 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 249, is not correct; de Gaulle does not mention any reconsideration of French political-military policy.

58 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 251–253 (read 252) is correct.

58 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 256, is not correct; de Gaulle explains that France has lived without the Common Market and would continue to live without it.
Appendix II (Continued)

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<td>58 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 258, is <em>not correct</em>; Peyrefitte relates how de Gaulle purposely kept Erhard waiting during his visit to Bonn in 1964.</td>
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<tr>
<td>58 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 261, is <em>correct</em>.</td>
<td>c</td>
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<tr>
<td>58 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 182 is <em>not correct</em>; de Gaulle threatens to &quot;liquidate the Common Market&quot; if his agricultural demands are not met but does not mention any reconsideration of French political-military policy.</td>
<td>nc</td>
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<td>58 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 188 is <em>not correct</em>; de Gaulle merely discusses his attitude toward the British FTA proposals of 1958.</td>
<td>nc</td>
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<tr>
<td>59 Institut [SS]: reference is <em>partly correct</em>, in that Prate argues that in the fields of tariff liberalization and the CAP de Gaulle accepted the Treaty of Rome; but Prate does not mention efforts by Germany or Britain to undermine the CAP; nor does he link these with GATT negotiations.</td>
<td>pc</td>
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<tr>
<td>60 Lacouture [SS]: reference is <em>correct.</em></td>
<td>c</td>
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<tr>
<td>60 Silj [SS]: reference is <em>correct.</em></td>
<td>c</td>
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<tr>
<td>60 Debré [SP]: reference <em>Trois, 440</em> (read <em>Trois, 3:440</em>) is <em>correct</em>.</td>
<td>c ia</td>
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<tr>
<td>60 Jouve (read Jouve [HS]): reference 441–448 is <em>correct</em>; note, however, that these pages do not contain a report on the Fouchet negotiations but only the text of the two French draft proposals; note also that Moravcsik does not refer to the compromise text of 15 March 1962 on pp. 449–458.</td>
<td>c nh ia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>60 Soutou [SS]: reference 136–137 is <em>correct.</em></td>
<td>c</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>61 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 214–217, is <em>correct</em>; note, however, that Peyrefitte does not say here that de Gaulle rejected proposals to resurrect the Fouchet Plan or that he rejected a &quot;modest quid pro quo&quot; during negotiations that were under way; de Gaulle used the Parliamentary elections as an example, arguing that &quot;the Italians, the Belgians, and the Dutch&quot; had ulterior motives in declaring their support for the Fouchet Plan; he was convinced they would deliberately request something in exchange that would be unacceptable to France—&quot;for instance, elections to the European Assembly&quot;—so that they could blame the failure on France.</td>
<td>c nh</td>
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<tr>
<td>62 Berstein [SS]: reference 58–60 is <em>not correct</em>; the reference should be to pp. 60–61, where Serge Berstein briefly discusses Debré’s position but does not mention the latter’s lack of significant political support or his supposed lack of intellectual creativity</td>
<td>nc ia</td>
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### Appendix II (Continued)

#### Note no.

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<td>63 Soutou [SS]:</td>
<td>reference 136ff. is correct.</td>
<td>c</td>
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<tr>
<td>64 Maillard [SS]:</td>
<td>reference 205 is not correct; Pierre Maillard does not discuss agriculture, French commercial interests, or the Fouchet Plan here; he refers to the geopolitical lessons de Gaulle drew from the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 in relation to the Franco-German Cooperation Treaty.</td>
<td>nc</td>
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<tr>
<td>65 Jouve [SS]:</td>
<td>reference 72 is correct.</td>
<td>c</td>
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<tr>
<td>65 Jouve [HS]:</td>
<td>reference 485–502 is correct.</td>
<td>c</td>
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<tr>
<td>65 Debré [SP]:</td>
<td>reference <em>Trois</em>, 2:432ff. (read <em>Trois</em>, 3:430–431) is correct.</td>
<td>c ia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66 Peyrefitte (read Jouve [HS] and Vol. 2 instead of Vol. 1):</td>
<td>reference 498 is correct.</td>
<td>c ia</td>
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<tr>
<td>66 Peyrefitte (read Jouve [HS] and Vol. 2 instead of Vol. 1):</td>
<td>reference 489–496 is not specific, but correct; although it is unclear why p. 497 is left out.</td>
<td>c nh</td>
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<tr>
<td>66 Jouve [HS]:</td>
<td>reference 439–440 (read 439) is correct; note, however, that there is no deception at all; see our discussion of Peyrefitte’s memorandum in the section titled “A Deliberate Deception: Peyrefitte’s Memorandum.”</td>
<td>c nh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66 Alexandre [SS]:</td>
<td>reference 113 is correct; note, however, “to appreciate the deception,” that Alexandre continues with the following advice to Giscard given by de Gaulle: “There is only one force to which men submit: the truth. It doesn’t matter whether the truth is obvious today or becomes plain later. Always rely on the truth” (p. 113).</td>
<td>c nh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67 Jouve [HS]:</td>
<td>reference esp. 2:498 (read esp. 2:489) is correct.</td>
<td>c ia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67 Burin des Roziers [SP]:</td>
<td>reference 51–53 is not correct; Etienne Burin des Roziers does not see the Fouchet Plan as a subterfuge “to assure forward motion on economic issues”; he also does not state that Monnet was initially persuaded that de Gaulle had been “converted” to federalist principles.</td>
<td>nc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68 Burin des Roziers [SP]:</td>
<td>reference 51–53 is not correct; Burin des Roziers does not refer to forcing “the British mistakenly to ‘exclude themselves’ from a superficially federalist arrangement.”</td>
<td>nc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69 Jouve [HS]:</td>
<td>reference 489–499 is not correct; Peyrefitte does not argue that France has to block British entry to achieve the CAP.</td>
<td>nc</td>
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</table>
Note no.

70 De Gaulle [HP]: reference Lettres, 389–390 (read Lettres, VIII, 398–399) is partly correct; in his instructions for Debré, de Gaulle did not state that if the Plan for a Union of States (the Fouchet Plan did not exist at the time he wrote his instructions) succeeded, the EEC would "wither away"; he said that the organization would be "put in its place"; he does not refer to "confronting the other five member governments" or to "supranationalism"; he does, however, speak of "dealing directly" with "the first fruits of integration, if it proved impossible to establish the political Europe."

70 Soutou [SS]: reference 40–55 (read 45) is partly correct; Georges-Henri Soutou does not refer to "confronting the five other member governments."

70 Bodenheimer [SS]: reference 76–84 is not correct; Susanne Bodenheimer does not discuss de Gaulle's strategy with respect to the Fouchet Plan on these pages; she discusses "the possibilities for compromise on the substantive issues" in the final months of the Fouchet negotiations.

70 Jouve [HS]: reference 489–499 is not correct; Debré's negotiation guidelines for his coming talks with Adenauer are not mentioned on these pages.

71 Lamb [HS]: reference 175 is correct, although it should read "the end of the Brussels negotiations"; note, however that Piers Dixon comments here on the negotiators' failure to reach an agreement at the beginning of August 1962. Richard Lamb observes that other members of the British delegation, as well as Macmillan, did not share Dixon's pessimistic view (Lamb, 1995: pp. 175–177).

71 Lamb [HS]: reference 144 is not correct, in the sense that the story about the Quai d'Orsay's formation of an "ad hoc committee of some of their most intelligent members to think up ways of keeping us out" dated from March 1961 not from mid-1962.

71 Lamb [HS]: reference 166 is not correct; none of the points mentioned by Moravcsik in the paragraph preceding note 71 is discussed by Lamb here.

71 Lamb [HS]: reference 172–175 is not correct; Lamb discusses the breakdown of negotiations on 4–5 August as a result of the new French interpretation of "what had been agreed by the Six about the financial regulation" (Lamb, 1995: p. 175).
Appendix II (Continued)

Note no.

71 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference 1, 299–304, is not correct; Peyrefitte discusses the French position with respect to eventual British membership in the EC but does not refer at all to a hardening of French demands after mid-1962, a special committee formed at the Quai d’Orsay, or British “ambassadors in Paris” (sic) who were reporting to London that de Gaulle would wait for the elections of November 1962.

71 Kaiser [HS]: reference is correct; note, however, that Wolfram Kaiser concludes that “the analysis of Anglo-French relations in this period seems to substantiate the more traditional interpretation of de Gaulle’s European policy which emphasizes his ideological objections to British accession to the EEC” (84–85).

71 Horne [HS]: reference 2:257 is not correct; Alastair Horne does not discuss here any of the topics mentioned by Moravcsik in the paragraph preceding note 71.

71 Jebb (read Gladwyn [SP]): reference 292–298 is not correct; Gladwyn gives an overview of his thoughts on EEC, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), and other topics in the first months of 1957; he does not discuss the negotiations in 1962.

71 Silj [SS]: reference 82 is correct.

71 Dixon [SP]: reference is not correct; Piers Dixon (not Sir Pierson Dixon, as Moravcsik writes) discusses here the entry negotiations held from March to July 1962.

71 De la Serre [SS]: reference 193–196 is correct; note, however, that Françoise de la Serre offers a geopolitical explanation of the French veto.

71 Kaiser [HS]: reference is correct, though not sufficiently specific; see pp. 165–167.

72 Maillard [SS]: reference 184–185 is not correct; Maillard does not discuss de Gaulle’s rejection of British membership or the Cabinet meeting of 17 (read: 19) December 1962; he discusses the negotiations of December 1961–January 1962 on the CAP and the transition to the second stage.

72 Jouve [SS]: reference is not correct; pp. 492–498 deal with Franco-Belux cooperation, the canalization of the Moselle, and the construction of a waterway between the North Sea and the Mediterranean.
Appendix II (Continued)

Note no.

72 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference 1, 332–337, is not correct; de Gaulle does not ridicule Macmillan; as he explains to his ministers when he informs them of the results of the Rambouillet talks, "He was melancholic, and so was I. We prefer the Great Britain of Macmillan to that of the Labourites, and we would love to help him stay in power. But what could I do? Except sing for him the Edith Piaf song: Ne pleurez pas Milord." Note, moreover, that the Council of Ministers was on 19, not 17, December, and that de Gaulle did not announce his decision to veto British entry during the Council of Ministers meeting. He revealed his decision to Peyrefitte only after the Council of Ministers session.

73 Ziegler [SS]: reference 334 is not correct; Philip Ziegler does not discuss the softening of French policy; he discusses the problems in Harold Wilson's Cabinet with respect to the British application.

73 Jay [SP]: reference is correct.

73 Young [SS]: reference 4–5 (read 5) is correct.

74 Cogan [SS]: reference is correct.

74 Petitfils [SS]: reference 13 is not correct; Jean-Christian Petitfils does not speak here about the Fouchet Plan, the MLF, or Britain as a "Trojan Horse.

75 Berstein [SS]: reference is not correct; Berstein states that de Gaulle already told Macmillan on 15 December that "he did not believe the conditions existed for British membership." The Nassau agreement merely "confirmed" the correctness of this point of view. Berstein does not "cite de Gaulle's anger at Macmillan's failure to tell him about the Polaris nuclear deal."

75 Jouve [HS]: reference 182–185 (read 186) is correct; note, however, that Jouve speculates on the effects of Macmillan's silence at Rambouillet.

76 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 187 is correct.

76 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 187–189 is correct.

76 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 218–220 is not correct; de Gaulle not only discusses economic obstacles to British entry but also mentions geopolitical considerations.

77 Jouve [HS]: reference 283–288 is correct.

77 Jouve [HS]: reference 289 is correct.

77 Jouve [HS]: reference 291 is not correct; in his speech de Gaulle does not refer to Britain, trade liberalization, or agriculture.
Appendix II (Continued)

Note no.

77 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference 294 is not correct; I, 294, relates some comments by de Gaulle on the character of the French; II, 294, discusses the “empty chair” crisis of 1965.

78 Lacouture [SS]: reference must be to De Gaulle: The Ruler, 359, and is correct.

78 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference I, 303, is correct but superfluous given the citation in the same note to I, 302–304 (see below).

78 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference I, 332–336, is correct.

78 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference I, 302–304, is correct.

78 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 224–225, is not correct; de Gaulle does not observe that the “British might well be invited to join after the CAP is irreversibly established”; note also that de Gaulle makes this observation to Peyrefitte, again after the meeting of the Council of Ministers.

78 Campbell [SS]: reference 132 is correct.

78 Silj [SS]: reference 87–88 is correct; note, however that Silj adds that the predominance of the agricultural issue was true “even apart from the general political motives which in de Gaulle’s mind barred Great Britain’s entry into the Community” (p. 88).

78 Grosser [SS]: reference 82–84 is not correct; Alfred Grosser does not discuss the “preeminence of economic considerations” in rejecting British membership.

79 Silj [SS]: reference 89–90 (read 89) is correct; Moravcsik’s quotation is not entirely correct.

79 Couve [SP]: reference 335 is not correct; Couve deals with the crisis of 1965–1966.

79 Roth [SS]: reference 164 is partly correct, in the sense that, according to Roth, Edward Heath remarked: “Mr Couve de Murville . . . said that nothing could be settled without the financial regulation!” Roth also reports that Heath said this not “just before the veto” but in the early hours of Sunday, 5 August 1962.

79 Bodenheimer [SS]: reference 127 is correct.

79 Jebb, read Gladwyn [SP]: reference 292ff. is not correct; Gladwyn does not discuss the motivations for the French veto on these pages.
Appendix II (Continued)

Note no.

79 Marjolin [SP]: reference 320 is correct.  
nc  

79 Marjolin [SP]: reference 340 is not correct; Robert Marjolin quotes Camps and then states that he greeted the veto "with relief" because "the change in British thinking was not yet complete"; he does not refer to the "financial regulation" of agriculture.  
nc

79 Marjolin [SP]: reference 358 is correct; note, however, that Marjolin does not discuss the veto.  
c nh

79 Marjolin [SP]: reference 338–339 is not correct; Marjolin cites geopolitical reasons for de Gaulle's fear of British entry.  
nc

79 Spaak [SP]: reference 476ff. is not correct; Paul-Henri Spaak does not mention French commercial concerns or financial regulation of agriculture in his discussion of de Gaulle's veto on these pages; Spaak puts the "chief blame for what just happened on General de Gaulle—on his personality, his character and psychology" (p. 478).  
nc

80 Jouve [HS]: reference is not correct; p. 102 deals with de Gaulle's utterances on Europe in 1942.  
nc

80 Marjolin [SP]: reference 358 is not correct; Marjolin does not refer to Georges Pompidou's and Pisani's explanations of de Gaulle's veto.  
nc

80 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference I, 157, is not correct; Pisani does not maintain that the veto forestalled an Anglo-German alliance to undermine financing for a CAP; Pompidou does not refer to Great Britain; he laments that the others do not understand that the French point of view is the one most consistent with the Rome Treaty.  
nc

81 Kusterer [HP]: reference 318 is correct.  
c

81 Kusterer [HP]: reference 350–352 is not correct; it was not de Gaulle but Couve, Pompidou, and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder who talked about the negotiations regarding GATT. Adenauer and de Gaulle disagreed on whether the French agricultural question should be seen as the test of the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation (de Gaulle) or as a test (Adenauer).  
nc

82 Akten 1963 [HP]: Doc. 21, reference is partly correct; in his note Josef Jansen makes no reference to the United States.  
pc
De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and The Choice for Europe

Appendix II (Continued)

Note no.

82 Akten 1963 [HP]: Doc. 43, reference is not correct; de Gaulle stated that in his opinion “the critical point is, and this is undoubtedly also the opinion of the Commission, that England was ‘either unable or unwilling to enter the Common Market under the same conditions that we did’” (p. 145); he did not speak about “common rules . . . particularly in agriculture”; nor did de Gaulle go on and on about agricultural matters, pace Moravcsik’s suggestion.

82 PREM 11/3775 [HP]: we were unable to check this reference.

82 Akten 1963 [HP]: Doc. 94, reference is correct, although Ambassador Herbert Blankenhorn does not state that the meeting was private (p. 320).

82 Akten 1963 [HP]: Doc. 24, reference is correct.

82 Akten 1963 [HP]: Doc. 32, reference is not correct; Peyrefitte tells Günther von Hase that de Gaulle said “Great Britain at the next elections will not be able to withstand the temptation of a Labour experiment. . . . He, the general, reckons that, after a Labour period of about four or five years, and a new victory of the Conservatives, the further strengthened EEC and England, freed from its Labour complex and led by a young conservative team, will be ready for one another” (p. 103).

82 Akten 1963 [HP]: Doc. 39, reference is not correct; de Gaulle observes to Schröder that “if Labour really came to power, then one would have to stick out two or three unpleasant years”; de Gaulle makes no mention at all of decolonization.

82 Akten 1963 [HP]: Doc. 60, reference is not correct; this document does not record negotiations between the French and the Germans; it contains a report of the conference of the foreign ministers of the EEC at the end of January 1963 (pp. 203–215).

82 Akten 1963 [HP]: Doc. 77, reference is not correct; Heinz Voigt, of the Political Department in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reports on a conversation with Berndt von Staden, directeur de cabinet with the Commission; contrary to Moravcsik’s claim, von Staden doubts the official French version that France rejected British entry only on economic grounds (p. 256).
Appendix II (Continued)

Note no.

82 Akten 1963 [HP]: Doc. 94, reference is not correct; this document is a review by ambassador Blankenhorn of de Gaulle’s foreign policy at the beginning of 1963; Blankenhorn did not negotiate directly with the French about British membership of the EEC; he notes that the “French leaders of the negotiations claim that economic differences were the decisive ground for breaking off the negotiations” (p. 319); for his part, Blankenhorn adds that French objections to Great Britain’s dependence on the United States also must have played a role (p. 320).

82 Akten 1963 [HP]: Doc. 55, reference is not correct; Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein informs Foreign Minister Schröder about the ”deep irritation in administrative Washington with the French veto” (pp. 187–189).

83 Campbell [SS]: reference 129–130 is not correct; John Campbell does not discuss the issue of agriculture here.

83 Lamb [HS]: reference 196–197 is not correct; Lamb does not say that Macmillan in retrospect accepted that the issue of agriculture had been the “sticking point” over which France sought to block formation of an Anglo-German coalition.

83 Lamb [HS]: reference 202 is correct.

83 Horne [HS]: reference 2:428 is not correct; Macmillan’s reflection is not in retrospect; it came prior to the final weeks of the negotiations; moreover, Macmillan does not say that the French tried to block formation of an Anglo-German coalition.

83 Ziegler [SS]: reference 334 is not correct; Ziegler neither discusses the issue of agriculture nor refers to back channels through which Wilson was informed that Pompidou had raised economic objections.

84 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 217–220 is correct.

85 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference I, 335, is correct.

85 Maillard [SS]: reference 184.n. is not correct; neither of the notes on this page refers to de Gaulle’s veto: in n. 1 Maillard refers to Couve de Murville (1971) to suggest that the principles of the CAP had been fixed by Sicco Mansholt in July 1960; and n. 2 is a reference to de Gaulle’s letter to Adenauer of 22 December 1961.

85 Lacouture [SS]: reference (read De Gaulle: The Ruler, 356–358) is correct.

86 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 261, is correct.
Appendix II (Continued)

Note no.

86 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 594, is not correct; de Gaulle does not discuss the Commission’s alleged tactics.

86 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 620, is correct.

87 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 220, is correct.

87 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 286–293, is correct; note, however, that we were unable to trace a reference to “primordial interests” on these pages.

88 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference I, 66–68, is correct.

88 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference I (read II), 281–282, is correct.

88 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference I (read II), 289–292, is correct.

88 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference I (read II), 296, is not correct; de Gaulle explains that the rejection of French financial proposals with respect to the CAP provided France with an “unexpected pretext.”

88 Spinelli [SS]: reference 210–211 is not correct; Altiero Spinelli does not discuss de Gaulle’s “prudently audacious” planning of the “empty chair” crisis on these pages.

89 Berstein [SS]: reference is correct; Berstein refers on p. 173 to the “brutality” of de Gaulle’s attitude; note, however, that Berstein refers here neither to de Gaulle’s suspicions of “U.S. proposals for an MLF” nor to his having felt “rebuffed by the Erhard government in Germany.”

89 Camps [SS]: reference 104–115 is not correct; Camps here discusses the two Luxembourg meetings of January 1966; she does not mention her alleged conjecture that de Gaulle adapted “a more ‘brutal’ style of negotiation” after being disillusioned by the collapse of the Fouchet Plan, suspicious of U.S. proposals for an MLF, and rebuffed by the Erhard government.”

90 Ménil [SS]: reference is not correct; Pattison de Ménil does not herself characterize Walter Hallstein as sitting in Brussels, “decked out in the trappings of sovereignty”; it is de Gaulle who does so in his Mémoires d’espoir, which Pattison de Ménil quotes.

90 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 287–91, is correct.

90 Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 297–299, is correct; note, however, that on p. 298 Peyrefitte relates de Gaulle’s qualification of his relation with the “farming interests” as: “I am not responsible to these notables of the farmers. I am responsible to France, and France will understand my actions.”
Appendix II (Continued)

Note no.

91 **Hoffmann [SS]**: reference 303 is correct. c

91 **de la Serre in Willis (ed.) [SS]**: reference 150 is not correct; de la Serre does not here discuss de Gaulle’s “determination to prevent . . . a leap into that supranational nirvana.” nc

91 **Hoffmann [SS]**: reference 390–391 is not correct; Hoffmann does not discuss the rhetorical aspects of de Gaulle’s policy, including the explicit invocation of grandeur. nc

91 **Lasok and Soldatos [SS]**: reference 546–569 is partly correct; on pp. 558–60 Charles Pentland refers to de Gaulle’s attacks against “the dogmatic supranationalist pretentions” of the Hallstein Commission. pc

92 **Peyrefitte [HP]**: reference II, 255, is correct. c

92 **Peyrefitte [HP]**: reference II, 294, is correct. c

92 **Lindberg [SS]**: reference 238 is not correct; Leon Lindberg does not refer to de Gaulle’s concerns regarding anything that “might undermine carefully negotiated arrangements for net EC financial transfers to French farmers.” nc

93 **Peyrefitte [HP]**: reference II, 263, is correct. c

93 **Peyrefitte [HP]**: reference II, 264–265, is correct. c

94 **Jouve** (read Jouve [SS]): reference passim is correct. c ia

94 **Peyrefitte [HP]**: reference (read II) passim is correct. c ia

94 **Camps [SS]**: reference is not correct; Moravcsik has not produced a correct reference to Camps’s alleged conjecture that “the boycott stemmed from de Gaulle’s anger over Kennedy’s proposals for an MLF” (TCfE, p. 195). nc

95 **Peyrefitte [HP]**: reference II, 255, is correct. c

96 **Peyrefitte [HP]**: reference II, 620, is correct. c

96 **Peyrefitte [HP]**: reference II, 594, is correct. c

96 **Peyrefitte [HP]**: reference II, 356–374, is not correct; nothing on these eighteen pages indicates that de Gaulle “conceded on policy.” nc

97 **Willis (ed.) [SS]**: reference 148 is correct; note, however, that de la Serre is here quoting Anne Jaumín-Ponsar, who, in turn, is quoting Michel Gaudet. c nh
Appendix II (Continued)

Note no.

97  Noël [SP]: reference is not correct; Émile Noël does not discuss “how little” de Gaulle achieved; he discusses the functioning of the institutions of the Communities during the crisis.

97  Lahr [SP]: reference is partly correct insofar as Rudolf Lahr also emphasizes that the Luxembourg Declaration left the existing “legal regulations” intact; but it is not correct insofar as Lahr precisely discusses the paralyzing effects of the Luxembourg Declaration, noting that from then on the Six refrained from qualified majority voting not only on questions of vital interest to a member state but also on almost all other questions; Lahr does not discuss the “Soames Affair.”

98  Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 620, is not correct; de Gaulle does not argue that opposition from farmers rendered a French threat to withdraw from the EC incredible; he says that the Commission wrongly calculated that the farmers’ opposition would force de Gaulle to give in before the elections.

98  Lindberg and Scheingold [SS]: reference 256 is not correct; Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold do not discuss the weakness of domestic support for de Gaulle’s position; they cite Ronald Inglehart’s 1967 research regarding attitudes toward European integration.

98  Camps [SS]: reference 122 is not correct; Camps does not refer to the incredibility of “any French threat to withdraw from the EC”; she notes that the Common Market was very popular in France and adds that de Gaulle “himself may have felt the Common Market was expendable.”

98  Newhouse [SS]: references 89–90, 127–134, and 151–155 are not correct; Newhouse does not discuss the incredibility of the French threat here.

98  Moravcsik [SS]: reference 221–222 is not correct; Moravcsik does not discuss the incredibility of the French threat on these pages.

98  Moravcsik [SS]: reference 228–230 (read 229) is correct.

99  Peyrefitte [HP]: reference II, 612–613, is correct.

100 de Gaulle [SP]: reference 132 (read 131–132) is correct.