

This article was downloaded by: *[Trinity College Dublin]*

On: 3 July 2009

Access details: *Access Details: [subscription number 785045691]*

Publisher *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Journal of European Public Policy

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title-content=t713685697>

States' bargaining success in the European Union

Javier Arregui; Robert Thomson

Online Publication Date: 01 August 2009

To cite this Article Arregui, Javier and Thomson, Robert(2009)'States' bargaining success in the European Union',*Journal of European Public Policy*,16:5,655 — 676

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13501760902983168

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760902983168>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf>

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

States' bargaining success in the European Union

Javier Arregui and Robert Thomson

ABSTRACT This study describes and explains states' bargaining success in legislative decision-making in the European Union. We measure bargaining success by the congruence between decision outcomes and states' policy positions on a wide range of controversies. We develop and test expectations about variation in states' bargaining success from models of bargaining and legislative procedures. The analyses are based on a newly updated dataset on legislative decision-making that covers the period before and after the 2004 enlargement. The main descriptive finding is that there are no clear winners and losers among member states when a large number of decision outcomes are considered together. However, on any given issue, states typically differ markedly from each other in their bargaining success. Both bargaining models and procedural models provide insights that explain some of the variation in states' bargaining success.

KEY WORDS Bargaining success; European Union; legislation.

The most important questions in the study of any political system from a political science perspective are arguably who gets what, and why. The present study addresses these questions in the context of legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU) by describing and explaining states' bargaining success. The first part of the analysis describes variation in the extent to which decision outcomes on a range of controversial issues correspond with states' policy positions. The legitimacy of a regime depends on it being 'reasonable from every individual's point of view' (D'Agostino 2008). When judging how reasonable the political system of the EU is, an obvious point of reference for a state's representatives is the congruence between their state's positions and decision outcomes. They may also compare this level of congruence with the congruence between other states' positions and decision outcomes. We find that across a large number of decision outcomes, states do not differ substantially from one another in terms of their bargaining success.

The second part of the analysis explains variation in bargaining success. While there are only small differences in states' bargaining success across a large number of decision outcomes, there are substantial differences in states' bargaining success in relation to individual decision outcomes. This explanatory analysis draws insights from a range of perspectives on legislative decision-making in the EU. We develop expectations about states' bargaining success from models

of bargaining (e.g. Achen 2006a; Arregui *et al.* 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 2004) and from models of legislative procedures in the EU (e.g. Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). In line with expectations derived from bargaining models, we find that states have more bargaining success if they have strong network relations with other states, and if they clearly prioritize the issues under negotiation. In line with models of legislative procedures, states have more bargaining success if their positions are close to the Commission when the consultation procedure applies and to the European Parliament (EP) when the codecision procedure applies.

The present study offers one of the first systematic comparisons of decision-making before and after the historic enlargement of the EU in 2004. A key question in this regard is how the new member states are fairing in terms of their bargaining success. We find that new member states are having relatively high levels of bargaining success, as did the small member states in the EU-15. This success can be explained at least in part by the relatively narrow range of interests, and consequently clear priorities, held by small member states.

EXPECTATIONS ABOUT STATES' BARGAINING SUCCESS

We measure bargaining success as the level of agreement between the policy positions that states' representatives support at the outset of negotiations on a legislative proposal and the decision outcomes contained in the final legislative act. Our main descriptive expectation is that:

Member states do not differ markedly from each other in their bargaining success.

This expectation is based on the combination of three pieces of evidence from the existing literature. First, there are weak structures in the alignments of states' representatives in the Council of Ministers. On the basis of some of the information examined in the present study, the information pertaining to the EU-15, Thomson *et al.* conclude that 'perhaps the most important finding is the lack of structure in the positions of the actors' (2004: 257; see also Nugent 1999: 474; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 250). Second, decision outcomes are generally compromises among the positions taken by the decision-making actors (Achen 2006b). When these conditions exist, it is highly likely that decision outcomes are not systematically closer to or further from the positions of some states than other states. Indeed, the third piece of evidence in support of our expectation is from a study by Bailer (2004), who measured states' bargaining success on the basis of some of the information examined here. Bailer found that 'success is relatively evenly distributed over all issues and countries ... [This] guarantees that all member states are occasionally winners and losers' (2004: 112–13).

Bargaining success is driven by both power and luck (Barry 1980: 184). A decision outcome may be close to the outcome favoured by an actor because that actor exerted influence over the decision. A decision outcome may also

be close to an actor's position because that actor was lucky. In other words, the outcome would have been much the same without that actor's intervention. The actor may, for instance, have taken a position close to an obvious compromise outcome. Our expectations regarding relevant explanatory factors refer to variables that reflect both states' luck and their ability and propensity to exercise power.

Bargaining models aim to explain decision outcomes by focusing on the informal norms that define how actors interact with each other. Models that posit co-operative and inclusive modes of interaction are generally thought to be most applicable to decision-making in the EU (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 2004; Achen 2006b). The Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950; Achen 2006a) is a simple co-operative bargaining model from which we can derive clear expectations about states' bargaining success. Nash formulated the bargaining solution as an answer to the question of what each actor should get in a situation where they must collaborate for mutual benefit. Informally, the essence of Nash's answer is that it is the decision outcome that minimizes the utility losses of the actors involved. Suppose that a controversial issue can be represented on a uni-dimensional policy scale (for instance, a scale ranging from 0 to 100), and that each member state can be placed on this scale to represent the decision outcome it favours most. Represented as the compromise model, the Nash solution's prediction of the decision outcome is simply the mean average of the actors' policy positions, weighted by the product of their capabilities and the levels of salience they attach to the issue on which the prediction is being made. As a formula:

$$Outcome_a = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n position_{ia} capabilities_{ia} salience_{ia}}{\sum_{i=1}^n capabilities_{ia} salience_{ia}}$$

Where $Outcome_a$ is the prediction of the decision outcome on issue a . $position_{ia}$ denotes the policy position of actor i (from the set of actors, n) on issue a . $capabilities_{ia}$ denotes the capabilities of actor i on issue a . $salience_{ia}$ is the level of salience actor i attaches to issue a .

From the Nash bargaining solution represented as the compromise model it follows that:

Member states with more extreme positions than other states have less bargaining success.

If decision outcomes are a weighted average of actors' positions, then decision outcomes will be far from the positions of actors with extreme positions. Of course, if the outcome is a compromise among the positions of actors with extreme positions, then an actor with a moderate position may be close to the decision outcome due to its good fortune rather than its power.

The Nash bargaining solution represented as the compromise model also directs our attention to issue salience. It implies that:

Member states that attach higher levels of salience to an issue than other states have more bargaining success.

In the logic of the compromise model, issue salience gauges the extent to which an actor will put into effect its potential to influence other actors and the decision outcome. The compromise model also makes clear that relative salience, not absolute salience, is relevant to explaining bargaining success. If all actors attach an equally high level of salience to an issue, then none of these actors will have an advantage due to the levels of salience they attach to the issue.

The third component of the compromise model is the capabilities that each actor can bring to bear in influencing the decision outcome. The compromise model does not specify the sources of actors' capabilities. Indeed, in this approach to modelling political bargaining, capabilities depend on the possession of a range of resources that could be used to exert influence (Bueno de Mesquita 2003: ch. 7). Whether or not a resource is relevant depends on the decision situation in question. For example, military resources are unlikely to be relevant when the EU's banking regulations are being debated. However, the strength of a state's diplomatic ties with other states may be relevant. The number of votes that a member state holds might also be a resource at the influence stage if this enables it to make credible threats or promises to other actors. Therefore, we consider some of the possible sources of states' capabilities.

The first possible source of states' capabilities that we consider concerns the rotating Council presidency. Every six months a new state assumes responsibility for chairing meetings. We expect that the rotating Council presidency provides states with some potential to influence decision outcomes in line with their favoured positions. Specifically, we expect that:

The member state that holds the Council presidency when a legislative proposal is decided on has more bargaining success on the issues raised by that proposal.

Several researchers have concluded that the Council presidency may use its position to successfully advocate its national interest using the power of the chair (Garman and Hilditch 1998: 279–80; Kollman 2003; Bunse 2006; Tallberg 2006). Tallberg (2004; 2006: 29–39) emphasizes how presidents obtain privileged access to information about other states' policy preferences in the course of fulfilling their presidential functions. Such information enables presidents to craft compromise proposals that are as close as possible to their own policy positions. Three recent studies that examined some of the data examined in the present study found evidence that decision outcomes are somewhat closer to the positions of the states that were in the chair at the time when those decisions were taken (Schalk *et al.* 2007; Thomson 2008a; Warntjen 2008).¹

The second source of states' capabilities that we consider is network capital (Naurin 2007; Naurin and Lindahl 2008). An actor's network capital refers to the depth and breadth of the co-operation networks in which it is embedded. Naurin measured the distribution of network capital in the EU-15 and in the enlarged EU by surveying 361 officials from all permanent representations in 2003 and 2006. The main question he and his team asked of these officials

was 'Which member states do you most often co-operate with within your working group, in order to develop a common position?' Based on their answers to this question, Naurin formulated estimates of each state's network capital. Naurin's measures reveal that the largest member states, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, have the highest stocks of network capital. However, some small and medium-sized states, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark, have the next-highest stocks of network capital, more than Spain and Italy. Naurin (2007) observes that there is remarkably little variation in states' network capital across policy areas. We expect that:

Member states with more network capital have more bargaining success.

Readers are referred to Naurin (2007) and Naurin and Lindahl (2008) for details of the research design for the measures of network capital, including reliability and validity tests, and the precise estimates of states' network capital.

If we assume that the size of a state is positively related to its capabilities, we might expect size to be positively associated with bargaining success. Larger states generally have larger bureaucracies at their disposal, which might be deployed to lobby other actors. Larger states also have more economic resources that could be a source of leverage when influencing other actors. If we take population as a measure of size, we might expect that:

Member states with larger populations have more bargaining success.

Population sizes are reflected in the distribution of qualified majority votes in the Council. States' formal voting power is, of course, an important aspect of the formal rules of decision-making emphasized in models of the EU's legislative procedures. Accordingly, we might expect that:

Member states with more voting power have more bargaining success.

Due to the relatively small sizes of most new member states, we might expect them to have lower levels of bargaining success. In addition to being small, new member states in the enlarged EU might suffer from inexperience and limited resources (Goetz 2005: 254).

While there are theoretical reasons to expect that large states enjoy more bargaining success, existing research does not reveal such a pattern. The EU has safeguards that protect the influence of small states, such as the requirement of unanimity in many policy areas and super-majorities on other policy areas. There is also evidence that small states exert influence on decision outcomes via the European Commission (Bunse *et al.* 2005; Thomson 2008b: 189). Mattila's (2006) analysis concludes that decision outcomes on the allocation of EU funds are disproportionately favourable to small member states. Slapin (2006) concludes that large states did not obtain more favourable outcomes than other states from the intergovernmental conference negotiations leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam.

Thomson (2008a: 610–11) also finds that decision outcomes in legislative decision-making are in fact somewhat less favourable to large states than to other states. He suggests that an explanation for this lies in the range of interests

held by large and small states. Since large states have a broader range of interests than small and medium-sized states, they take positions on a larger proportion of controversial issues. The relative infrequency with which small states take positions means that when they do, decision-makers in the Council are particularly attentive to them. In the present study, we test this explanation of large states' low levels of bargaining success.

Models of the EU's legislative procedures explain decision outcomes partly on the basis of the policy outcome favoured most by the agenda-setter. The agenda-setter is the actor entitled to introduce legislative proposals, or proposals for resolving controversies. According to the consultation procedure, the Commission introduces a proposal and the Council must approve it either by qualified majority voting or by unanimity. The Council can only change the Commission's proposal unanimously. According to models of the consultation procedure (e.g. Tsebelis and Garrett 2000), the Commission will use its agenda-setting power to formulate a proposal that will receive the required support in the Council and be as close as possible to its own policy preference. Therefore, we expect that:

On issues subject to the consultation procedure, member states with positions closer to the European Commission have more bargaining success.

According to the codecision procedure, the EP is a co-legislator of equal weight to the Council. Tsebelis (2002: 264–5) argues that neither the EP nor the Council has a first-mover advantage under codecision. Similarly, Tsebelis and Garrett (2000: 24–5) posit that a reasonable expectation of the decision outcome in a controversy between the EP and the Council would be a Nash 'split the difference' outcome. Other analysts posit that one of the two chambers has a first-mover advantage, but they disagree on which chamber this is (e.g. Crombez 1997; Steunenberg 1997: 220–2). Nonetheless, all procedural models appear to support the following expectation:

On issues subject to the codecision procedure, member states with positions closer to the European Parliament have more bargaining success.

As with our expectation that states with more extreme positions than other states have less bargaining success, the above two expectations refer to the effect of states' luck on their bargaining success, rather than their power.

RESEARCH DESIGN

We conceive of controversies raised by legislative proposals as policy scales. This method of representing controversies spatially has been applied in a range of studies of decision-making in national and international politics (see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita 2003; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994). More details of the research design decisions taken when constructing the dataset used in the present study can be found in Thomson *et al.* (2006). Reliability and validity tests, which yielded satisfactory results, are published in Thomson (2006) and König *et al.* (2007).

What should vodka be made of and how should it be labelled?




Figure 1 A controversy from the legislative proposal on the labelling of spirit drinks (COD/2005/125)

Notes: Saliency scores in parentheses. AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: United Kingdom; COM: Commission; EP: European Parliament.

An example of this way of representing controversies is given in Figure 1. The example is taken from a controversial issue raised by a legislative proposal on the labelling of spirit drinks.² The controversy surrounding this proposal can be understood in terms of both substantial economic interests and deep cultural sensitivities. The main controversy concerned the raw materials that should be permitted in vodka and the labelling of vodka. The situation prior to the adoption of this legislation was that producers did not have to specify ingredients on the label. Moreover, vodka could be made from traditional ingredients, potatoes and cereals, or non-traditional materials, such as sugar beet and fruit. This *status quo* position was supported by the United Kingdom, among other member states (position 0 on the left of the policy scale in Figure 1). This position was clearly in line with the UK's economic interests, since it has large producers of vodka made from fruit. This situation was a blight in the eyes of traditional vodka producers, notably Sweden and Poland. Why, they reasoned, should other spirits such as whisky and brandy enjoy regulatory protection, but not vodka? They called for a ban on the production of vodka from raw materials other than potatoes and cereals. The legislative proposal contained provisions that permitted all raw materials, but stipulated that there should be a large label detailing the raw material used. The key informants placed this policy alternative on position 40 on the policy scale, somewhat more favourable to the UK's position than to Sweden's position. During the intense negotiations that followed, the legislative proposal was changed so that the labelling requirement became weaker. In the final text that was adopted, producers of vodka from non-traditional materials would only have to report this on a

small label, which might even be located discretely on the back of the bottle. The decision outcome was judged by the key informants to be located at position 20, much closer to the *status quo* than to Sweden's position. This was also the position taken by the EP in its first reading, which was approved by the Council.

A total of 93 legislative proposals were selected for study, 70 from the EU-15 period and 23 from the post-2004 period. Legislative proposals were selected according to three main criteria. First, each proposal was on the Council's agenda in the years 1999, 2000 or after the 2004 enlargement. Legislative proposals introduced up to December 2005 were included. Second, the selected proposals were subject to either the consultation or the codecision procedures, the two most commonly used procedures. Third, the selection was restricted to proposals on which there was an indication of at least some political importance and controversy. Each proposal was mentioned in news services covering European affairs: *Agence Europe* in the EU-15 period or *Agence Europe* and *European Voice* in the post-2004 period. Furthermore, key informants had to identify at least one substantive disagreement between at least some of the actors. We included directives, regulations and decisions in the EU-15 study, but excluded decisions from the post-2004 study. The effect of changing the new services and instruments in the post-2004 study was to focus the selection on more high-profile proposals. In the EU-15 study, we found that many of the proposals we had initially selected were highly technical and not controversial at all. The policy areas represented most prominently in the selection of EU-15 proposals are agriculture and the internal market, each with 14 proposals, although fisheries (seven proposals) and other policy areas are also present. Compared to the EU-15 study, the selection of proposals for the post-2004 study is more evenly distributed across different policy areas.³ As reported in Table 1, we identified decision outcomes for almost all of the issues raised in the EU-15 selection, and for 57 of the 70 issues raised by the post-2004 proposals. The remaining issues from the post-2004 study are still pending.

Information on controversial issues and actors' positions on these issues was collected in semi-structured interviews with 263 key informants (125 key informants in the EU-15 study and 138 informants in the post-2004 study). These interviews typically lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. We require detailed information on actors' positions, which means our sources have to be close to the discussions. The Commission officials interviewed (31 in the EU-15 study and 17 in the post-2004 study) were usually responsible for drafting the proposals and monitoring the subsequent discussions. The officials from a range of permanent representations (69 in the EU-15 study and 80 in the post-2004 study, including new member states) were usually the responsible desk officers. The individuals from the EP (four in the EU-15 study and 41 in the post-2004 study) were either Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) or their assistants.⁴ A further nine officials from the Council secretariat and 12 from interest groups were interviewed in the EU-15 study.

Table 1 Distribution of selected proposals

<i>Study</i>	<i>EP involvement</i>	<i>Council voting rule</i>	<i>Legislative proposals selected by researchers</i>	<i>Issues identified by experts</i>	<i>Type of instrument</i>	<i>Legislative proposals</i>	<i>Issues</i>
EU-15	COD	QMV	23 (23)	63 (62)			
		Unan.	5 (5)	12 (12)	Directives	30 (30)	78 (77)
	CNS	QMV	22 (22)	55 (55)	Regulations	33 (33)	79 (79)
Unan.		20 (20)	44 (44)	Decisions	7 (7)	17 (17)	
Total			70 (70)	174 (173)		70 (70)	174 (173)
Post-2004 EU	COD	QMV	12 (9)	30 (21)			
		Unan.	4 (3)	16 (12)	Directives	10 (6)	32 (19)
	CNS	QMV	6 (6)	20 (20)	Regulations	13 (13)	38 (38)
Unan.		1 (1)	4 (4)	Decisions	–	–	
Total			23 (19)	70 (57)		23 (19)	70 (57)

Notes: The numbers of cases with decision outcomes are in parentheses. COD: codecision; CNS: consultation.

During these semi-structured interviews, each of the controversial issues was represented spatially, as a policy scale ranging from 0 to 100 that represents the range of the bargaining space. Usually two or three issues were sufficient to represent the main controversies raised by a proposal. The informants estimated each actor's positions, defined as the decision outcomes favoured most by each actor at the time of the introduction of the Commission's legislative proposal, or as soon as the actor took a position thereafter. The informants also estimated the level of importance each of the actors attached to each issue. This level of importance was estimated on a scale of 0–100, whereby a score of zero indicates that the issue was of no importance whatsoever, 50 that it had an 'average' level of importance to the actor concerned, and 100 that the issue could hardly be more important. The relations between the salience scores for different actors are more important than the absolute values of the scores. As with the procedures for estimating actors' positions on controversial issues, the procedure for estimating issue salience was adapted from a widely used procedure for decision analysis (Bueno de Mesquita 2003: 598–602).

The dependent variable in the following analyses is the distance between each state's position and the decision outcome on each issue. Therefore, when the decision outcome is fully in line with a state's position, as it is for the Czech Republic in the example in Figure 1, the dependent variable has a value of 0. When the outcome is further from a state's position, as it is for Sweden in the example, the dependent variable has a higher value (in the example, the value for Sweden is 80). This measure is appropriate given that we are interested in how close decision outcomes are to states' positions relative to how far away they could have been. A distance of 100 scale points may represent a large substantive policy difference on one issue, but only a modest difference on another issue. However, on both issues an actor whose position is located 100 scale points from the decision outcome has as little bargaining success as it could have had given the distribution of actors' positions.⁵

The operationalization of most of the independent variables referred to above is straightforward:

- The extremity of a state's position is measured by the absolute distance between that state's position and the mean average position of all states that took a position.
- The level of salience a state attaches to an issue relative to other states is measured by the level of salience the state attaches to the issue (as estimated by key informants on the 0–100 salience scale) minus the mean average level of salience that all member states attach to the issue.
- States' network capital, as mentioned above, is measured by Naurin's (2007) measure of network capital.
- States' presidential status is measured by a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the state held the Council presidency at the time at which the proposal was decided upon.⁶
- States' size is measured by population size in millions.

- States' voting power is measured by the Shapley–Shubik Index (SSI; Shapley and Shubik 1954) score based on the numbers of votes member states have. Under qualified majority voting, the relations between actors' SSI scores are similar to the relations between the numbers of qualified majority votes they hold. Under unanimity, all actors have equal votes and SSI scores. We apply the voting power measure only to the subset of issues decided on by qualified majority voting.⁷ Since population size and voting power are highly correlated, we do not consider these variables together.
- States' proximity to the Commission and EP is measured by the absolute distances to the positions taken by each of these institutions.

The unit of analysis in our study is the member state issue dyad. If 15 member states took a position on an issue, we have 15 observations of member states' bargaining success on that issue. Since our observations are not independent of each other, we compute White's robust standard errors clustered at the level of the issues in our dataset.

ANALYSES

Figure 2 gives a graphical overview of the distances between actors' initial policy positions and decision outcomes before and after the 2004 enlargement. The horizontal lines represent the 95 per cent confidence intervals for the distances between actors' positions and decision outcomes, and therefore give an indication of variation in actors' bargaining success. The circles at the centre of the lines indicate the average bargaining success. Further to the right of the figures, there are larger distances between decision outcomes and actors' positions, and therefore less bargaining success. The Commission and the EP are included for comparison, but our main focus is on states' bargaining success.

There is little variation among states in terms of bargaining success. Almost all of the 95 per cent confidence intervals overlap, indicating that the differences among states' bargaining success across all of the issues are insignificant. According to the EU-15 data, France is on average furthest from decision outcomes, and Sweden closest. This weak tendency is reversed according to the post-2004 data, which indicate that Sweden is on average somewhat further from decision outcomes than France.

In the post-2004 EU, new member states do not appear to differ much from old member states in their levels of bargaining success. It is, however, noteworthy that all ten states that joined in 2004 are located at the bottom of the lower part of Figure 2, indicating that they are closer to the decision outcomes than the old members. The only old member that joins this group of new member states with relatively high levels of bargaining success is Ireland.

Despite the similarities in states' bargaining success at the aggregate level, there is still much variation to be explained in states' bargaining success on different issues. Table 2 gives the results of multivariate analyses of the determinants of bargaining success. The first model is applied to all cases in the dataset.

Table 2 Factors affecting bargaining success

	<i>Council voting rule</i>			<i>EP involvement</i>		<i>Enlargement</i>	
	<i>Model 1 All cases</i>	<i>Model 2 QMV cases</i>	<i>Model 3 Unanimity cases</i>	<i>Model 4 Consultation cases</i>	<i>Model 5 Co-decision cases</i>	<i>Model 6 Pre-2004 cases</i>	<i>Model 7 Post-2004 cases</i>
Extremity	0.57 (0.08)***	0.60 (0.10)***	0.56 (0.12)***	0.64 (0.12)***	0.54 (0.10)***	0.62 (0.10)***	0.50 (0.12)***
Relative salience	-0.12 (0.06)**	-0.17 (0.07)**	0.01 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.23 (0.08)***	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.10)
Network capital	-1.78 (0.82)**	-2.32 (1.09)**	-0.81 (0.99)	-1.92 (1.17)*	-1.44 (1.16)	-2.04 (0.90)**	-1.14 (1.68)
Presidency	-2.79 (1.81)	-2.17 (2.37)	-5.15 (2.51)**	-1.65 (1.92)	-2.48 (2.88)	-4.24 (2.31)**	2.79 (2.43)
New member state							-5.88 (3.52)*
Population size (millions)	0.06 (0.03)**		-0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.09 (0.04)**	0.08 (0.03)**	0.00 (0.05)

Voting power		1.07 (0.34)***					
Distance to Commission	0.09 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.13 (0.11)	0.17 (0.09)*	0.04 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)*	-0.00 (0.10)
Distance to EP	0.12 (0.06)*	0.05 (0.07)	0.23 (0.10)**	0.03 (0.10)	0.15 (0.08)*	0.06 (0.08)	0.24 (0.10)**
Constant	12.99 (3.32)***	13.00 (4.02)***	7.04 (4.11)*	9.24 (3.81)**	14.33 (4.84)***	11.86 (3.85)***	16.47 (6.87)**
F(p)	20.94 (0.00)	17.00 (0.00)	36.45 (0.00)	17.12 (0.00)	13.27 (0.00)	20.03 (0.00)	10.19 (0.00)
R ²	0.20	0.17	0.36	0.26	0.18	0.22	0.24
N	2,884	1,992	892	1,296	1,588	1,962	922

Notes: Dependent variable is the absolute distance between states' initial positions and final decision outcomes. Standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered at the level of issues within the dataset. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p ≤ 0.10.




Figure 2 Average distances between actors' positions and decision outcomes on legislation introduced and decided before (above) and after (below) the 2004 enlargement

Notes: 95 per cent confidence intervals shown. Pre-2004 distances based on 173 controversial issues. Post-2004 distances based on 57 controversial issues. AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain; SE: Sweden; UK: United Kingdom; COM: Commission; EP: European Parliament.

Table 3 Effects of key variables on bargaining success

<i>Explanatory variable</i>	<i>Effect on distance between member states' positions and outcomes</i>	<i>95% confidence interval</i>
Extremity (all issues)	+53.38	(38.01, 68.21)
Saliency (all issues)	-19.11	(-37.62, -0.99)
Network capital (all issues)	-5.75	(-11.07, -0.63)
Population size (all issues)	+5.15	(0.55, 9.76)
Voting power (QMV issues)	+11.60	(4.01, 18.81)
Distance to Commission (consultation issues)	+17.45	(-1.15, 36.41)
Distance to EP (codecision issues)	+14.95	(-0.11, 29.97)

Notes: First differences in expected outcome calculated using Clarify (King *et al.* 2000). Effects of extremity, saliency, network capital and population size calculated on the basis of Model 1 in Table 2 (all cases, $n = 2,884$). Effect of voting power calculated on the basis of Model 2 in Table 2 (QMV cases, $n = 1,992$). Effect of distance to Commission calculated on the basis of Model 4 in Table 2 (consultation cases, $n = 1,296$). Effect of distance to EP calculated on the basis of Model 5 in Table 2 (codecision cases, $n = 1,588$).

We then apply the model to subsets of cases, first, to test the robustness of our findings and, second, because some of our supposed explanatory variables are only relevant to particular subsets of observations.⁸ Table 3 gives information on the expected effects of moving from the minimum to the maximum observed values of our explanatory variables. This additional information allows us to gauge the magnitude of the effects in a more nuanced fashion.

The extremity of states' policy positions has the largest and most debilitating effect on states' bargaining success. The coefficient associated with extremity in the first model, which applies to all cases, is 0.57. For every one unit increase in the extremity of a state's position, the decision outcome is on average 0.57 policy scale points further from its policy position. Table 3 reports the results of our simulations of the effects of moving from the minimum (0) to the maximum (93.33) value of extremity, controlling for other variables of interest. Such a move increases the distance between the decision outcome and an actor's position by 53.38 policy scale points (on our policy scales ranging from 0 to 100).

The higher the level of saliency a state attaches to an issue relative to the levels of saliency that other states attach to the issue, the smaller the distance between the decision outcome and that state's position. Every one-unit increase in relative saliency reduces the distance between the outcome and the relevant state's position by 0.12 policy scale points (Table 3, Model 1). Relative saliency ranges from -74.67 to 92. A change from the minimum to the maximum value is associated with a decrease of 19.11 scale points in the distance between the decision outcome and a state's position.

Network capital has a modest but statistically significant effect on member states' bargaining success. States with more network capital have more bargaining success. The coefficients associated with network capital are negative in all of the models reported in Table 2, which indicates a robust relationship. The simulations reported in Table 3 indicate that decision outcomes are 5.75 policy scale points closer to the state with the highest network capital (the UK in the EU-15) than to the state with the lowest network capital (Malta in the enlarged EU).

Holding the presidency of the Council appears to have only a modest effect on states' bargaining success under certain conditions. The coefficient in the first model, which is applied to all of the cases, is in the expected direction, which is negative, but is not statistically significant. In the cases subject to unanimity (Model 3 in Table 2) and the cases from before the 2004 enlargement (Model 6) we do find statistically significant coefficients in line with our expectation. The coefficient from Model 6 (the EU-15 cases) indicates that decision outcomes are on average 4.24 scale points closer to the positions of states that held the presidency. We find no evidence that presidential incumbency affects states' bargaining success after the 2004 enlargement (Model 7).

Contrary to our theoretical expectations, but in line with previous research, we find that large states generally have less bargaining success. The coefficient associated with population size is positive, which indicates that the larger the member state, the larger the distance between the decision outcome and the state's position. Only when the unanimity rule applies (Model 3) are decision outcomes not further from the positions of larger member states. The simulations reported in Table 3 reveal that decision outcomes are 5.15 policy scale points further from the positions of the largest member state (Germany) than from the smallest member states (Luxembourg and Malta, both of which have populations of 400,000). Similarly, the coefficient associated with voting power is positive, indicating that decision outcomes are further from the positions of states with more votes under qualified majority voting (Model 2). Finally, new member states, which are small or medium-sized, have more bargaining success. The coefficient associated with the new member state variable in Model 7 indicates that decision outcomes are on average 5.88 policy scale points closer to the positions of new member states than to the positions of old member states.

We speculated that small states' bargaining success could be explained by the fact that they have narrower interests and consequently clearer priorities than large states. Our empirical analyses support this explanation. First, large states take positions on higher percentages of issues than small states. Of all 244 controversial issues in our dataset, France, Germany and the UK took positions on 97, 96 and 95 per cent respectively. By contrast, among the old member states, the lowest frequency of position-taking was by Luxembourg, Austria and Greece with 77, 82 and 84 per cent respectively. We find the lowest frequencies of position-taking by the small new member states. Cyprus, Slovenia and Malta took positions on 66, 69 and 70 per cent of the 70 controversial issues in our post-2004 study. Second, we included a variable in our models containing

the percentage of issues on which states take positions. When we did so, the significant effects relating to member states' size, voting power, and the distinction between old and new states were reduced substantially or disappeared.⁹

The similarities between states' positions and the positions of the Commission and the EP also have a noteworthy impact on states' bargaining success. If the consultation procedure applies (Table 2, Model 4), a state has more bargaining success if its position is closer to the Commission's position. Moving from the minimum to the maximum values of the variable measuring distance to the Commission (which ranges from 0 to 100) increases the distance between the decision outcome and a state's position by 17.45 policy scale units under consultation (Table 3). We find an effect of a similar magnitude regarding the distance between a state's position and the EP when the codecision procedure applies (Table 2, Model 5).

CONCLUSION

Across the broad range of controversies examined, differences among states in the congruence between decision outcomes and their policy positions are small. The absence of clear winners and losers is essential to the legitimacy of the EU, since state representatives are among the individuals whose approval is required for the system to be legitimate (cf. D'Agostino 2008). Decision outcomes in the EU may be considered just regardless of whether representatives evaluate them following the logics of mutual advantage or impartiality (cf. Barry 1989). From the logic of mutual advantage, outcomes are at least as close to any state's position as to other states' positions. From the logic of impartiality, outcomes may be approved of by states' representatives on a footing of equality, since even the smallest states appear to gain as much as the largest.

States' bargaining success is to a large extent due to luck (cf. Barry 1980: 184). The Nash bargaining solution in the guise of the compromise model (Nash 1950; Achen 2006a) predicts that decision outcomes are located around the centre of the distribution of actors' positions. Consequently, we expected and found that outcomes are close to the positions of actors with moderate positions. Models of the EU's legislative procedures emphasize the importance of the supranational actors, particularly the Commission under the consultation procedure and the EP under the codecision procedure (e.g. Steunenberg 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). As expected, we found that states have more bargaining success when their position is closer to the Commission if the consultation procedure applies and to the EP if the codecision procedure applies.

States' bargaining success is not fully determined by the structure of the decision situation in which they are embedded; agency also matters. Decision outcomes on an issue are closer to the positions of states that attach higher levels of salience to the issue than other states. According to the compromise model, salience gauges the extent to which a state is willing to put into effect its capabilities to influence other actors and decision outcomes. This is another feature of the political system that supports its perceived fairness and

legitimacy among state representatives. Decision outcomes tend to be closer to the positions of states that attach most importance to the issues at stake.

Bargaining models posit that actors' capabilities have an important impact on their ability to realize decision outcomes that are favourable to them. Capabilities consist of a range of power resources that are relevant to the particular decision situation in question (Bueno de Mesquita 2003: ch. 7). We considered and found evidence for the impact of the rotating Council presidency and network capital as capabilities that positively affect states' bargaining success. In the EU-15, prior to the 2004 enlargement, the member state that held the Council presidency when a legislative proposal was decided on had somewhat more bargaining success. This finding supports the conclusions of several other studies, which found that the Council presidency can successfully advocate its national interest using the power of the chair (Garman and Hilditch 1998: 279–80; Kollman 2003; Bunse 2006; Tallberg 2006; Schalk *et al.* 2007; Thomson 2008a; Warntjen 2008). We do not observe such an effect in the enlarged EU. On the contrary, decision outcomes are slightly further from the positions of the finalizing presidency in the enlarged EU. This suggests that while the Council presidency remains an important arrangement in the enlarged EU, states are less able to use their occupancy of the chair to their own advantage. Council presidents have two broad goals: to facilitate agreements and to pursue their own national interests. It seems likely that more effort is needed to achieve the first goal in the enlarged and more diverse EU than was previously the case. This may have eclipsed presidents' ability to pursue the second goal.

Member states with more network capital also have more bargaining success. Network capital refers to the depth and breadth of the co-operation networks in which member states are embedded (Naurin 2007; Naurin and Lindahl 2008). In the informal consultations that take place prior to Council working groups, states with more network capital are consulted more frequently and by a broader range of states. Naurin (2007) provides evidence that states in which there is more inter-personal trust in the general population, in particular Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands, have relatively high levels of network capital. Given the co-operative nature of bargaining in the EU, network capital based on strong trust relations is a highly relevant resource.

Larger states have somewhat less bargaining success than small states in the EU. Decision outcomes are also somewhat closer to the positions of the new member states that joined in 2004, most of which are small states. While these findings are contrary to some theoretical expectations, they are in line with previous research (e.g. Bunse *et al.* 2005; Slapin 2006; Mattila 2006; Thomson 2008b: 189). Our explanation for this empirical finding, which we find evidence for, is based on the range of states' interests. Small states have a narrower range of interests than large states. For instance, small states typically have less diversified economies as a result of which a narrower range of regulatory proposals affect their interests. Representatives of states with relatively few positions can argue more effectively that their states' essential interests are at stake when they do take positions. This line of argumentation is effective in

the EU given the prevailing norm of accommodating all states' essential interests whenever possible. Considering this finding, researchers might gain explanatory leverage by expanding the narrow concept of issue salience in today's bargaining models to include the breadth of actors' interests.

On the impact of enlargement, we find that decision outcomes are closer to the positions of new member states than to the positions of old member states. The effect of enlargement is, however, dampened by the fact that new member states, like other small and medium-sized states, have a narrower range of interests and therefore take fewer positions than the larger old members. Moreover, the new member states, like the old members, are not a cohesive block of states with the same policy positions. More often than not, there is considerable variation in the positions taken within the group of new members. The cross-cutting cleavages that characterized actor alignments in the EU of 15 member states persist in the enlarged EU. This cornerstone of pluralist democratic theory (Dahl 1989: 251–4), which helps to avoid stark differences between winners and losers, has not been dislodged by enlargement.

Biographical notes: Javier Arregui is Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain. Robert Thomson is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland.

Addresses for correspondence: Javier Arregui, Department of Political Science, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Jaume I Building, Ramon Trias Fargas 25–27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. email: javier.arregui@upf.edu/Robert Thomson, Department of Political Science, College Green, Trinity College, Dublin 2, Ireland. email: thomsor@tcd.ie

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We thank James Hyland and three anonymous referees for constructive comments. We acknowledge the financial support of the Dutch Science Foundation, the Institute for International Integration Studies at Trinity College Dublin and the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science. The data on the enlarged EU examined here were collected by the present authors, Rory Costello and Robin Hertz.

NOTES

- 1 These three studies conclude that member states which are in the chair at the time a proposal is adopted have an advantage. Only Thomson (2008a) examines and reports a conditional effect of presidential status earlier in the policy process.
- 2 Regulation (EC) No. 110/2008 of the EP and Council of 15 January 2008 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and protection of geographical indicators of spirit drinks (introduced as COD/2005/028). Nine semi-structured interviews were held with officials in Brussels on this dossier.

- 3 The 23 proposals included in the post-2004 study are sugar sector reform (CNS/2005/118), animal welfare (CNS/2005/009), agricultural fund (CNS/2004/161), CAP financing (CNS/2004/164), fisheries fund (CNS/2004/169), hake fish conservation (CNS/2003/318), conservation of fish in Biscay area (CNS/2003/327), the Regional Development Fund (COD/2004/167), including the general regulation of the Regional Development Fund (AVC/2004/163) also dealt with in the same codecision package, the working time directive (COD/2004/209), LIFE environmental programme (COD/2004/218), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (COD/2004/219), port services (COD/2004/240), passengers with reduced mobility (COD/2005/007), data retention (COD/2005/182), waste (COD/2005/281), spirits (COD/2005/028), intellectual property rights (COD/2005/127), air pollution (COD/2005/183), pensions (COD/2005/214), broadcasting (COD/2005/260), payment services (COD/2005/245), and Visa information system (COD/2004/287).
- 4 A larger number of informants from the EP were interviewed in the post-2004 study. This was necessary because part of that study, which will be reported on elsewhere, examines the positions taken by actors within the EP.
- 5 Warntjen (2008: 326) criticizes the comparison of distances across issues, likening this to a meaningless accounting procedure whereby a company would compare profits in different countries without taking into account the different currencies used. This criticism neglects the important distinction between substantive policy differences and relative bargaining success. A more appropriate analogy between the present analysis of bargaining success and business success is the comparison of companies' market shares across markets as percentages of the sizes of those markets.
- 6 We also applied a measure that identified whether states occupied the Council presidency prior to the finalizing presidency and found no overall effect.
- 7 It is inappropriate to include SSI scores for qualified majority voting and unanimity in the same analysis. This would imply, for instance, that Germany has more voting power under qualified majority voting than under unanimity (Germany has a qualified majority voting SSI score of 11.70 and a unanimity SSI score of 6.67 in the EU-15). Arguably, however, Germany has more voting power under unanimity since it could always veto proposals. Therefore, we only include the SSI voting power scores for the subgroup of issues subject to the qualified majority voting rule (i.e. Model 2 in Table 2). The SSI scores were calculated using Powerslave by Pajala *et al.* (2002).
- 8 An alternative analytical procedure would be to clutter the model with more interaction terms. This would increase the number of independent variables in our model. The approach we take is in line with the advice of Achen (2002: 446–7) in that it reduces the number of independent variables and examines the relationships within supposedly more homogeneous groups of observations.
- 9 There is a significant positive correlation between population size and the percentage of issues on which states take positions ($r = 0.64$, $n = 25$, $p < 0.01$). On average, the 15 old member states took positions on 89 per cent of the issues on which they could have taken positions. On average, the ten new members that joined in 2004 took positions on 73 per cent of the issues on which they could have taken positions. We added the variable 'percentage positions', with the percentage of issues on which each member state took positions, to the models in Table 2 which indicated that large states have less bargaining success. In Model 1 (all cases), the coefficient of population was reduced to 0.05 (s.e. = 0.03, $p = 0.12$); percentage positions had a coefficient of 0.24 (s.e. = 0.19, $p = 0.20$). Model 2 (qualified majority voting cases): voting power coefficient reduced to 0.60 (s.e. = 0.36, $p = 0.10$); percentage positions coefficient 0.52 (s.e. = 0.22, $p = 0.02$). Model 5 (codecision cases): population coefficient reduced to 0.06 (s.e. = 0.04, $p = 0.16$); percentage positions coefficient 0.37 (s.e. = 0.23, $p = 0.12$). Model 6 (pre-2004 cases):

population coefficient reduced to 0.05 (s.e. = 0.03, $p = 0.10$); percentage positions coefficient 0.40 (s.e. = 0.20, $p = 0.05$). Model 7 (post-2004 cases): new member state coefficient became positive with a value of 1.25 (s.e. = 4.32, $p = 0.77$); percentage positions coefficient 0.56 (s.e. = 0.25, $p = 0.03$).

REFERENCES

- Achen, C.H. (2002) 'Toward a new political methodology: microfoundations and ART', *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 423–50.
- Achen, C.H. (2006a) 'Institutional realism and bargaining models', in R. Thomson, F.N. Stokman, C.H. Achen and T. König (eds), *The European Union Decides*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 86–123.
- Achen, C.H. (2006b) 'Evaluating political decision-making models', in R. Thomson, F.N. Stokman, C.H. Achen and T. König (eds), *The European Union Decides*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 264–98.
- Arregui, J., Stokman, F.N. and Thomson, R. (2006) 'Compromise, exchange and challenge in the EU', in R. Thomson, F.N. Stokman, C.H. Achen and T. König (eds), *The European Union Decides*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 124–52.
- Bailer, S. (2004) 'Bargaining success in the European Union: the impact of exogenous and endogenous power resources', *European Union Politics* 5(1): 99–124.
- Barry, B. (1980) 'Is it better to be powerful or lucky? Part 1', *Political Studies* 28: 183–94.
- Barry, B. (1989) *Justice as Impartiality: A Treatise on Social Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2003) *Principles of International Politics: People's Power, Preferences and Perceptions*, 2nd edn, Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. and Stokman, F.N. (eds) (1994) *European Community Decision-making: Models, Applications and Comparisons*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Bunse, S. (2006) 'The value of the rotating Council Presidency: small state entrepreneurship in the EU,' D.Phil, thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford University.
- Bunse, S., Magnette, P. and Nicolaïdis, K. (2005) 'Is the Commission the small member states' best friend?', Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 9.
- Crombez, C. (1997) 'The co-decision procedure in the European Union', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22: 97–119.
- D'Agostino, F. (2008) 'Public justification', in E.N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2008 Edition*. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/justification-public/>
- Dahl, R.A. (1989) *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Garman, J. and Hilditch, L. (1998) 'Behind the scenes: an examination of the importance of the informal processes at work in conciliation', *Journal of European Public Policy* 5(2): 271–84.
- Goetz, K.H. (2005) 'The new member states and the EU: responding to Europe', in S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (eds), *The Member States of the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 254–80.
- Hayes-Renshaw, F. and Wallace, H. (2006) *The Council of Ministers*, 2nd edn, London: Macmillan.
- King, G., Tomz, M. and Wittenberg, J. (2000) 'Making the most of statistical analyses: improving interpretation and presentation', *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 341–55.
- Kollman, K. (2003) 'The rotating Presidency of the European Council as a search for good policies', *European Union Politics* 4(1): 51–74.

- König, T., Lindburg, B., Lechner, S. and Pohlmeier, W. (2007) 'Bicameral conflict resolution in the European Union: an empirical analysis of conciliation committee bargains', *British Journal of Political Science* 37: 281–312.
- Mattila, M. (2006) 'Fiscal transfers and redistribution in the European Union: do smaller member states get more than their share?', *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(1): 34–51.
- Nash, J.F. (1950) 'The bargaining problem', *Econometrica* 18(2): 155–62.
- Naurin, D. (2007) 'Network capital and cooperation patterns in the working groups of the Council of the EU', EU Working Papers RSCAS 2007/14.
- Naurin, D. and Lindahl, R. (2008) 'East–North–South: coalition-building in the Council before and after enlargement', in D. Naurin and H. Wallace (eds), *Unveiling the Council of the European Union: Games Governments Play in Brussels*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 64–78.
- Nugent, N. (1999) *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, London: Macmillan.
- Pajala, A., Meskanen, T. and Kause, T. (2002) 'Powerslave Power Index Calculator: A Voting Body Analyser in the Voting Power and Power Index Website', University of Turku (published 22 April 2002, updated 31 May 2007). <http://powerslave.val.utu.fi/>
- Schalk, J., Torenvlied, R., Weesie, J. and Stokman, F.N. (2007) 'The power of the Presidency in EU Council decision-making', *European Union Politics* 8(2): 229–50.
- Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M. (1954) 'A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system', *American Political Science Review* 48: 787–92.
- Slapin, J.B. (2006) 'Who is powerful? Examining preferences and testing sources of bargaining strength at European intergovernmental conferences', *European Union Politics* 7(1): 51–76.
- Steunenberg, B. (1997) 'Codecision and its reform: a comparative analysis of decision-making rules in the European Union', in B. Steunenberg and F. van Vught (eds), *Political Institutions and Public Policy: Perspectives on European Decision-Making*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 205–29.
- Tallberg, J. (2004) 'The power of the Presidency: brokerage, efficiency and distribution in EU negotiations', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42(5): 999–1022.
- Tallberg, J. (2006) *Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thomson, R. (2006) 'A comparison of expert judgements with each other and with information from Council documentation', in R. Thomson, F.N. Stokman, C.H. Achen and T. König (eds), *The European Union Decides*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 329–47.
- Thomson, R. (2008a) 'Responsibility with power: the Council Presidency of the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46(3): 593–617.
- Thomson, R. (2008b) 'National actors in international organizations: the case of the European Commission', *Comparative Political Studies* 41(2): 169–93.
- Thomson, R., Boerefijn, J. and Stokman, F.N. (2004) 'Actor alignments in European Union decision making', *European Journal of Political Research* 43: 237–61.
- Thomson, R., Stokman, F.N., Achen, C.H. and König, T. (eds) (2006) *The European Union Decides*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tsebelis, G. (2002) *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Tsebelis, G. and Garrett, G. (2000) 'Legislative politics in the European Union', *European Union Politics* 1(1): 9–36.
- Warntjen, A. (2008) 'Council Presidency: power broker or burden? An empirical analysis', *European Union Politics* 9(3): 315–38.